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MUTUAL DEPENDENCY IN CHILD WELFARE
Clare Huntington*
The child welfare system is in need of fundamental reform. To the great
detriment of parents and children, in the current system the state 
waits for a
crisis in a family and then intervenes in a heavy-handed fashion. 
The state
pays scant attention to the prevention of child abuse and 
neglect. This Article
argues that the principal conceptual barrier to the adoption 
of a prevention-
oriented approach to child welfare is the dominant conception of family 
auton-
omy, which venerates freedom from state control. This Article proposes 
a novel
reconception of family autonomy that encourages engagement with the state,
rather than simply freedom from the state. An "engagement with" 
model of
family-state relations is both a more apt description of the actual 
relationship
between all families and the state and a better prescription for the 
well-being of
families. This model is built upon the mutual dependency of families 
and the
state: Families need state support to function well, and the state 
needs well-
functioning families. State support, however, must not come at 
the cost of
familial self-determination, a principle nominally served by the 'freedom 
from"
conception of family autonomy. Therefore, this Article addresses how 
the state
can both provide a more robust level of support for families while still 
protecting
familial self-determination, to the great benefit of parents, children, 
and the
state.
@ 2007 Clare Huntington. Individuals and 
nonprofit institutions may reproduce
and distribute copies of this Article in any format, 
at or below cost, for educational
purposes, so long as each copy identifies the 
author, provides a citation to the Notre
Dame Law Review, and includes this provision and copyright 
notice.
* Associate Professor of Law, University of Colorado Law 
School; J.D., Columbia
Law School; B.A., Oberlin College. An earlier 
version of this Article was presented at
the 2006 Annual Meeting of the Law and 
Society Association. I thank Jennifer
Collins, Kristin Collins, Nestor Davidson, 
Maxine Eichner, Martha Albertson
Fineman, Martin Guggenheim, Melissa Hart, Jill 
Elaine Hasday, Sarah Krakoff, Scott
Peppet, William Pizzi, Colene Robinson, Pierre Schlag, 
Elizabeth Scott, Phil Weiser,
Marianne Wesson, Robin West, and Noah Zatz 
for their insights and encouragement.
For their thoughtful comments and criticisms, 
I also thank the participants in a
faculty colloquium at Notre Dame Law School 
and a faculty workshop at the
University of Colorado Law School. Finally, I thank 
Sania Anwar, Gail Goodman,
Renee Neswadi, Teresa Tate, and Kirsten Westerland 
for their excellent research
assistance.
1485
NOTRE DAME LAW REVIEW
INTRODUCTION .................................................. 1486
I. THE FUNDAMENTAL MISORIENTATION OF CHILD WELFARE ... 1489
A. A Broken System ....................................... 1489
B. The Need for Prevention ................................ 1492
II. A CONCEPTUAL BARRIER TO PREVENTION: FAMILY
AUTONOMY ............................................... 1497
A. Autonomy as Freedom from State Control ................. 1497
B. Autonomy in the Child Welfare System ................... 1503
C. The Traditional Trade-Off Between State Support and Self-
Determination ......................................... 1505
III. RECONCEMVNG FAMILY AUTONOMY ......................... 1510
A. Engaging with the State ................................ 1511
1. Rejecting the Intervention/Nonintervention
Fram e ........................................... 1512
2. An Alternative Frame: Mutual Dependency ....... 1515
3. Taking Mutual Dependency Seriously ............. 1520
B. Furthering Self-Determination ............................ 1524
1. Concerns About a Diversity of Decisionmaking ... 1524
2. Equality Among Families ......................... 1530
C. Three Promising Examples .............................. 1531
CONCLUSION .................................................... 1536
INTRODUCTION
The child welfare system suffers from a fundamental misorienta-
tion. The prevailing response to families at risk of abuse and neglect
is to wait for a crisis, then act. In many cases, the state intervenes only
after abuse or neglect has occurred. At that point, the state often
removes a child from her home and places her in foster care, which
can be rife with its own dangers. Once the child is out of the home,
the state takes largely ineffective steps to reunite the family. This post
hoc approach to child welfare has devastating effects for children, par-
ents, and the state, By the time intervention occurs, children have
already been harmed. Parents have already succumbed to various ills,
such as substance abuse. And the state's interest in the stability of
families has been compromised, despite the system's twenty-two bil-
lion dollar annual price tag.'
These persistent problems could be largely avoided if the child
welfare system took prevention seriously. Targeted prevention pro-
grams as well as more broad based antipoverty programs have shown
1 See CYNTHIA ANDREWS SCARCELLA ET AL., THE URBAN INST., THE COST OF PRO-
TECrING VULNERABLE CHILDREN IV, at 6 (2004), available at http://www.urban.org/
uploadedPDF/411115.VulnerableChildrenV.pdf.
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tremendous success in both preventing child abuse and neglect and
improving the well-being of families. 2 Despite this success, and
despite evidence demonstrating the long-term ill effects of child abuse
and neglect,3 such programs remain almost entirely at the margins of
child welfare policy.4
The principal conceptual barrier to making prevention the cen-
terpiece of child welfare is the dominant conception of family auton-
omy, which venerates freedom from state intervention. 5  This
"freedom from" conception fosters a legal and cultural environment
that encourages the state to leave families alone until the family
"fails."
I propose a conception of family autonomy that instead encour-
ages "engagement with" the state. In the context of child welfare, this
engagement would take the form of targeted prevention programs
and general antipoverty efforts. Although some scholars have called
for this type of state support,6 this Article provides a solid theoretical
grounding for such engagement.
In particular, my proposed conception of family autonomy builds
upon an understanding that families and the state are mutually
dependent. Families need the state, but the state also needs families.
The state's interest sounds both in notions of capacity building
(ensuring the next generation is prepared to participate in a delibera-
tive democracy) and, more basically, in notions of societal stability
(ensuring the next generation is not an inordinate drain on state
resources).
Reconceiving family autonomy to encourage engagement with
the state, and basing this conception on mutual dependency is not,
2 See infra text accompanying notes 114-18.
3 See, e.g., Martin H. Teicher, Scars That Won't Heal The Neurobiology of Child
Abuse, Sci. AM., Mar. 2002, at 68, 70-75 (describing a study demonstrating that mal-
treatment during formative years can affect the development of the brain in ways that
cannot later be cured); Martin H. Teicher, Wounds That Time Won't Heal: The Neurobi-
ology of Child Abuse, 2 CEREBRUM 50, 50-67 (2000) (same). There is also evidence that
children who are abused or neglected are more likely to commit violent crimes.
FIGHT CRIME: INVEST IN KIDS, NEw HOPE FOR PREVENTING CHILD ABUSE AND NEGLECT 2
(2003) [hereinafter FiGIrr CRIME: INVEST IN KIDS] (noting that current research indi-
cates that, of the 900,000 substantiated cases of child abuse or neglect in one year, "an
additional 35,000 violent criminals and more than 250 murderers will emerge as
adults who would never have become violent criminals if not for the abuse and neg-
lect they endured as children"), available at http://eric.gov/ERICDocs/data/eric
docs2/content storage O1/OOOOOOOb/80/23/51/61.pdf.
4 See infra notes 31, 48 and accompanying text.
5 See infra Part II.A-B.
6 See infra Part I.B.
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however, sufficient. A reconceived family autonomy must also address
the trenchant concern that state support of families inevitably leads to
state control of families, especially for low-income families.7 Any
move away from the prevailing conception of family autonomy thus
involves a paradox: Families need state support to help avoid involve-
ment in the child welfare system, but that support often undermines
familial self-determination.
The answer is decoupling a family's need for state support from a
family's interest in self-determination. Families need engagement
with the state, but this engagement should not, and indeed need not,
require a loss of familial self-determination. To ensure that state sup-
port fosters, and does not hinder, familial self-determination, the state
should not supplant its will and preferences for those of the family but
must instead incorporate an element of deference and respect in all
programs that aim to support families. After arguing that this is theo-
retically possible, I demonstrate that it is also possible in practice, as
exemplified by three innovative programs.
A reconceived family autonomy will have two far-reaching bene-
fits. First, it will create a more effective child welfare system that actu-
ally serves the interests of children, parents, and the state by creating
an environment where a prevention-oriented approach to child wel-
fare can take root. Second, it will further equality among families by
working toward equality of opportunity for families to engage in the
important work of self-determination.
With a more realistic and constructive conception of the role of
the state, policymakers could begin to view child welfare policy in a
more holistic manner-and not as an afterthought to the breakdown
of the family. But if the halting steps that we have begun to take in
this direction are to move from anomalies to prevailing practice, such
steps must have a conceptual undergirding. This Article provides that
structure.
Part I of this Article describes the current crisis in the child wel-
fare system and the need for the prevention of child abuse and neg-
lect. Part II argues that the current conception of family autonomy
poses a formidable barrier to the adoption of a prevention-oriented
approach to child welfare. This Part first describes the dominant con-
ception of family autonomy and then argues that this conception has
a pernicious effect on the child welfare system. Part III proposes a
new conception of family autonomy. It first describes the importance
for families of engaging with the state rather than seeking freedom
from it. It then explores how such engagement need not come at the
7 See infra Part IH.C.
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price of familial self-determination. It continues by describing three
promising examples of a reconceived family autonomy-the Nurse-
Family Partnership program, the Chicago School District's Child-Par-
ent Center, and reforms to the child welfare system in Alabama.
I. THE FUNDAMENTAL MISORIENTATION OF CHILD WELFARE
The child welfare system is in serious disrepair. Although the sys-
tem is intended to protect children from abuse and neglect and to
keep families together, in too many cases state intervention helps
neither children nor parents. One of the principal failings of the sys-
tem is that it spends too few resources on the prevention of child
abuse and neglect, choosing instead to intervene only after child
abuse and neglect has occurred or is imminent. This Part describes
both the problems with the current system and the need for
prevention.
A. A Broken System
The child welfare system is designed to protect children believed
to be abused or neglected by their families and to strengthen families
where children are at imminent risk for abuse and neglect.8 The state
offers "child protective services" 9 to families, ranging from providing
support to keep a family together to removing a child from her home
and placing her in a foster home or institution. This removal can lead
to the termination of parental rights and the adoption of the child.
There are approximately half a million children in foster care, a num-
ber that has grown dramatically over the past two decades.' 0 As I have
8 See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 19-7-5 (West Supp. 2006); MINN. STAT. § 626.556
(2006); N.J. STAT ANN. § 30:4C-1(a) (West Supp. 2006).
9 In this Article, I use the term "child welfare system" and "child protective ser-
vices" interchangeably to refer to the entire system designed to respond to the abuse
and neglect of children.
10 The foster care population has risen from 302,000 in 1980 to 513,000 in 2005.
See CHILDREN'S BUREAU, U.S. DEP'T HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., THE AFCARS REPORT:
PRELIMINARY FY 2005 ESTIMATES AS OF SEPTEMBER 2006, at 1 (2006), available at http://
www.acf.hhs.gov/programs/cb/stats-research/afcars/tar/reportl 3.pdf; Richard
Wertheimer, Youth Who "Age Out" of Foster Care: Troubled Lives, Troubling Prospects,
CHILD TRENDs REs. BRIEF (Washington, D.C.), Dec. 2002, at 1, available at http://www.
childtrends.org/Files/FosterCareRB.pdf. In 2004, child welfare agencies across the
country investigated an estimated 3.5 million reports of alleged child maltreatment
and substantiated 872,000 of these reports. See CHILDREN'S BUREAU, U.S. DEP'T OF
HEALTH & HUAN SERVS., CHILD MALTR.ATMENT 2004, at 23 (2006), available at http:/
/www.acf.hhs.gov/programs/cb/pubs/cmO4/cmO4pdf. Not all of the substantiated
cases result in removal; in some instances, the family is provided services while the
children remain in the home. See id. at 84. Neglect is by far the most prevalent form
2007] 1489
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detailed elsewhere, this system simply does not serve the interests of
parents, children, or the state." Here, I will briefly describe three
dimensions of the system's extreme shortcomings. 12
First, the state does not resolve the underlying problems facing
families in the child welfare system. Instead, the prevailing response
to child abuse and neglect is to remove children from their homes
and place them in foster care. 13 Once in foster care, the state does
little to reunite families, often providing "treatment" to parents that
consists of little more than boilerplate plans.1 4 Further, the state allo-
cates scant resources for such treatment, virtually ensuring that par-
ents will not succeed.1 5 Additionally, the system is self-perpetuating.
Research has begun to show the intergenerational cycle of foster care.
Many parents of children in foster care today were once in foster care
themselves.1 6 The system does not address this cyclical nature of
abuse and neglect. For example, the state invests too little in mental
health programs that would enable victims to heal their own trauma
and help prevent the cycle from repeating.
of maltreatment (62.4% of cases), with physical abuse a distant second (17.5%), and
sexual abuse surfacing in about one in ten cases (9.7%). Id. at 24.
11 See Clare Huntington, Rights Myopia in Child Welfare, 53 UCLA L. REV. 637,
655-72 (2006).
12 In critiquing the child welfare system, I do not intend to perpetuate, as Marsha
Garrison so well describes, "a simplistic, anti-authoritarian ideology that cast[s] the
state child welfare system as villain and the families served by that system as victims."
Marsha Garrison, Reforming Child Protection: A Public Health Perspective, 12 VA. J. Soc.
POL'Y & L. 590, 595 (2005); accord Daniel Bergner, The Case of Marie and Her Sons, N.Y.
TIMES, July 23, 2006, § 6 (Magazine), at 28, 31-32 (profiling the care and thought of
child welfare workers). Although there is certainly evidence to support this narrative,
my point is that the state's interaction with families would be far more effective if
reoriented along the lines I suggest.
13 See Huntington, supra note 11, at 693 (discussing work of Duncan Lindsey and
his argument that the current child welfare system takes a "residual" approach to
abuse and neglect).
14 See, e.g., DOROTHY ROBERTS, SHATTERED BONDS 79 (2002); Annette R. Appell,
Protecting Children or Punishing Mothers: Gender, Race, and Class in the Child Protection
System, 48 S.C. L. REV. 577, 583 (1997).
15 See ROBERTS, supra note 14, at 89-91.
16 See, e.g., NAN P. ROMAN & PHYLLIS WOLFE, NAT'L ALLIANCE TO END HOMELESS-
NESS, WEB OF FAILURE: THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN FOSTER CARE AND HOMELESSNESS 9
(1995), http://www.endhomelessness.org/content/article/detail/1285/ (finding
that, in a nationwide survey of homeless families in shelters, seventy-seven percent of
those parents who had once been in foster care had at least one child who was or had
been in foster care, as compared to twenty-seven percent of parents in the shelters
that did not have such a history). For an anecdotal account of the intergenerational
cycle, see NINA BERNSTEIN, THE LOST CHILDREN OF WILDER (2001).
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The failure to focus on the underlying problems is particularly
egregious in cases of poverty-related neglect, where arguably the pro-
vision of services would be more effective than removal of children
from the home. Research has demonstrated that the major determi-
nant of children's removal from their parents' custody is not the sever-
ity of the abuse or neglect but, rather, unstable sources of parental
income.17 Poverty-related neglect cases-which constitute approxi-
mately fifty percent of all casest 8-typically involve substance abuse,
inadequate housing, or inappropriate child care arrangements. 19
Although substance abuse is a serious problem and may well present a
substantial threat to the well-being of a child, the child welfare system
can and should respond to poverty-related neglect in a different man-
ner from the ten percent of cases where the abuse and neglect is so
severe it warrants criminal proceedings. 20
Second, the removal of children from their homes-so-called
"child protection"-comes at a great cost to children. To be sure, in
cases of extreme abuse and neglect, removal may well be necessary
because of the danger in the home. But for the remaining cases,
although some intervention may be needed, removing the child and
placing her in foster care comes at a high cost. In addition to the
(even temporary) loss of their families, children often languish in fos-
17 See DUNCAN LINDsEY, THE WELFAR OF CHILDREN 168-69 (2d ed. 2004); Hunt-
ington, supra note 11, at 666-70 (discussing the correlation between poverty and
involvement in the child welfare system). Moreover, these removals are not spread
evenly across race lines and instead are concentrated among African-Americans. See
id. at 656-58 (discussing statistics concerning racial disparities in the child welfare
system as well as the argument that poverty, not racial bias, accounts for the differen-
tial rates of involvement); see also id. at 657-58 (discussing political and geographic
influences on removal of children).
18 SeeJANE WALDFOCEL, THE FUTURE OF CHILD PROTECrION 125 (1998).
19 See Huntington, supra note 11, at 666-68 (describing studies documenting this
aspect of the child welfare system).
20 See Douglas J. Besharov & Lisa A. Laumann, Don't Call It Child Abuse If It's Really
Poverty, 3J. CHILD. & PovFRTi 5, 24-29 (1997) (proposing that the state provide long-
term, supportive services to families where the children are suffering from poverty-
related neglect, rather than placing the children in the child welfare system). Fur-
ther, although media reports profiling cases of extreme abuse or neglect abound,
such cases are the exception. Indeed, the best estimates are that only ten percent of
all the cases in the child welfare system involve abuse and neglect serious enough to
warrant criminal charges. SeeWALDFOGEL, supra note 18, at 124-25. The remaining
forty percent fall somewhere in between, involving abuse or neglect that does not
require intervention by the criminal justice system but still rises above the level of
poverty-related neglect. Id. Although these categories are not perspicuous, distinc-
tions among cases can be made and it is clear that only a small percentage of cases fall
into the severe category.
2007] 1491
NOTRE DAME LAW REVIEW
ter care for months and even years, moving from one home to
another.2' Furthermore, while in foster care, children are at a height-
ened risk for additional abuse or neglect, especially sexual abuse. 22
And even if eventually reunified with a parent, children who were
once in foster care typically suffer significant economic, educational,
and psychological hardship. 23
Finally, this system is exceptionally expensive for the state. Fed-
eral, state, and local governments spend twenty-two billion dollars per
year on the child welfare system.24 The indirect monetary costs are
even higher.25 And the nonmonetary harm, although difficult to cal-
culate, is undeniably substantial. 26 As I detail below, despite the hefty
price tag, the system does not further the state's interest in building
the capacity of children or in preparing them to be contributing
members of society.27
B. The Need for Prevention
These problems of the child welfare system are well known and
proposals for change abound. For example, I have proposed a prob-
lem-solving model of child welfare to take the place of the current
21 See Huntington, supra note 11, at 660 (describing average lengths of stay and
multiple placements in foster care, even despite 1997 legislation intended to address
these problems).
22 Id. at 662 (describing increased risk in foster care of physical abuse, medical
neglect, and especially sexual abuse).
23 See id. at 661 & n.123, 662 (detailing these outcomes, including, for example,
the fact that sixty percent of young women who "age out" of foster care were pregnant
or already parenting within twelve to eighteen months after leaving the foster care
system (citing Ronna J. Cook, Are We Helping Foster Care Youth Prepare for Their Future?,
16 CHILD & YOUTH SERVS. REv. 213, 222 (1994))).
24 See ScARcELLA ET A.., supra note 1, at 6.
25 By one estimate, the indirect costs of the child welfare system amount to an
additional ninety-four billion dollars. SuZEI-rE FROMM, TOTAL ESTIMATED COST OF
CHILD ABUSE AND NEcLECT IN THE UNITED STATES (2001), available at http://www.
preventchildabusenj.org/documents/index/cost-analysis.pdf (estimating costs of
physical and mental health problems, juvenile delinquency, adult criminality, special
education needs, and lost productivity).
26 As Maxine Eichner argues:
Even more important are the vast non-financial costs to the polity from hav-
ing hundreds of thousands of its most vulnerable citizens, each of whom
should be developing their capabilities to become vigorous and active citi-
zens and productive members of society, become physically, mentally, and
emotionally damaged, many of them for life, by the current system.
Maxine Eichner, Children, Parents, and the State: Re-Thinking Foster Care Relationships, 12
VA. J. Soc. POL'Y & L. 448, 459 (2005).
27 See infra Part III.A.2-3.
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rights-based model.28 In that model, the state would seek to address
the underlying causes of child abuse and neglect, thus attempting to
solve the problems of the families in the system, rather than fruitlessly
calibrating the rights of parent and child. 29
A truly effective child welfare system, however, would seek to pre-
vent child abuse and neglect, thus limiting the number of families who
enter the system.30 As currently oriented, the child welfare system
does far too little to prevent child abuse and neglect and instead
works predominantly with families who have already abused or
neglected their children or where abuse or neglect is imminent 3 1
28 See Huntington, supra note 11, at 672-74.
29 See id. at 687-95. There have also been other proposals for reforming the
child welfare system, most notably a report published in 2004 by the Pew Commission
on Children in Foster Care. See PEW COMM'N ON CHILDREN IN FOSTER CARE, FOSTER-
ING THE FUTURE 16-18 (2004). The Commission made numerous recommendations,
including financial reforms that would increase flexibility in how federal funds are
allocated, federal assistance to adoptive families and guardians, improved data collec-
tion to ensure the efficient use of resources and increase public accountability, and
funding of further research. Id. The Commission also made recommendations
aimed toward strengthening the court system, including court performance measures,
outcome data collection, increased federal funding, a direct voice for parents and
children in the court room, effective representation, and leadership by state chief
justices to ensure the competency and training of those involved in proceedings. Id.
30 There is an active debate about when the state should intervene in cases of
suspected abuse and neglect. See, e.g., Douglas J. Besharov, Child Abuse Realities: Over-
Reporting and Poverty, 8 VA. J. Soc. POL'Y & L. 165, 200-01 (2000) (arguing that state
intervention is over-inclusive and the child welfare system should not include poverty-
related cases; in these cases, "society would do better if it did nothing.., rather than
the wrong-and often harmful-something"); Margaret F. Brinig, Choosing the Lesser
Evil: Comment on Besharov's "Child Abuse Realities", 8 VA.J. Soc. POL'Y & L. 205, 209-18
(2000) (responding to Professor Besharov by arguing that the state should err on the
side of over-inclusion, and further noting that it is possible to predict more accurately
which parents will abuse or neglect their children and thus use this prediction to
narrow the intervention net). When the state should intervene is an important ques-
tion, but, in this Article, I focus on preventing abuse and neglect altogether, not
where to draw the line in marginal cases.
31 See MARTIN GUGGENHEIM, WHAT'S WRONG WITH CHILDREN'S RIGHTS 181-85
(2005) (discussing the origins of child protection as part of the attempt to address
child poverty, but describing political changes in the twentieth century, particularly
the 1970s, that led away from framing child abuse as a product of greater social ills);
LINDSEY, supra note 17, at 177-78 (describing the "residual" nature of child welfare
system); VIOLENCE IN FAMILIES 15 (Rosemary Chalk & Patricia King eds., 1998). Fed-
eral laws governing the disbursement of child welfare funds reinforce this model.
States receive substantially more funds for the placement of children in foster care
and adoptive homes than for the prevention of child abuse and neglect. For exam-
ple, in 2002, for every federal dollar spent on the prevention of child abuse and neg-
lect, nine federal dollars were spent on foster care and an additional three federal
dollars on adoption. See SCARCELLA ET AL., supra note 1, at 16, 19, 21, 23-24.
2007 ]
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Numerous scholars have called for preventive approaches to
child welfare, although the prescriptions vary somewhat. For exam-
ple, Dorothy Roberts has argued in favor of programs that target pov-
erty. Professor Roberts contends that
[t]he ingredients for a strong child welfare program are clear and
simple: first, reduce family poverty by increasing the minimum
wage, instituting a guaranteed income, and enacting aggressive job
creation policies; second, establish a system of national health insur-
ance that covers everyone; third, provide high-quality subsidized
child care, preschool education, and paid parental leave for all fam-
ilies. Increasing the supply of affordable housing is also critical. 32
The call for supporting families in need harks back to the princi-
ples espoused by African-American advocates for child welfare at the
end of the nineteenth century. These advocates contended that the
best way to help children was to help all families and to support,
rather than penalize, mothers who were struggling to care for their
children.3 3
Other scholars contend that although general antipoverty mea-
sures will have some effect on rates of child abuse and neglect, more
targeted programs are also needed. For example, Marsha Garrison
has argued that "the link between poverty and child maltreatment is
indirect and poorly understood"3 4 and that the connection between
poverty and foster care placement rates, although correlated, is non-
linear.35 Professor Garrison agrees that poverty reduction has a role
32 ROBERTS, supra note 14, at 268; see also GUGGENHEIM, supra note 31, at 199-201
(making a similar argument for addressing poverty as a preventive means for address-
ing child abuse and neglect); Eichner, supra note 26, at 470-71 (same).
33 After the Civil War, African-American women-who were barred from the
child-saving movement of the time, which was generally led by white women-formed
their own groups to address the well-being of children. See Dorothy E. Roberts, Black
Club Women and Child Welfare: Lessons for Modern Reform, 32 FLA. ST. U. L. Rrv. 957,
957-58 (2005). Instead of focusing on a particular case of abuse or neglect, this
movement addressed the well-being of all children and also tried to support, rather
than penalize, mothers, believing that assisting mothers would assist the children. See
id. at 958, 963-71; see also GUGGENHEIM, supra note 31, at 182-83 (describing supports
that used to exist for low-income families).
34 Garrison, supra note 12, at 618.
35 See id. at 617-19. For example, Professor Garrison cites evidence demonstrat-
ing that the child poverty rate in the United States is fifteen percent and the foster
care placement rate is seventy-five per ten thousand children. Id. at 617. By compari-
son, Norway has a child poverty rate of four percent and a placement rate approxi-
mately half that of the United States. Id. But despite this correlation, Professor
Garrison contends that the link is nonlinear because the United Kingdom has a child
poverty rate that is several times higher than Norway's and yet has the same place-
ment rate. Id. at 618. Of course, many factors can account for placement rates,
[VOL. 82: 41494
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to play in the prevention of child abuse and neglect, 
but concludes
that it is not a silver bullet.
36 Instead, she favors such targeted pro-
grams as early childhood education that 
also serve the needs of par-
ents. 7 Indeed, targeted prevention programs 
have proven highly
successful.3 8 As I describe in greater detail below, these 
programs typ-
ically identify high-risk families and offer early 
intervention, either in
the form of a visiting nurse or early childhood 
education.3 9 Targeted
interventions for families can have lasting effects 
for both children
and parents40 and generate considerable savings 
for the state over the
long run.4
1
including the aggressiveness of state intervention, 
and placement rates are not neces-
sarily tantamount to maltreatment rates. But the 
statistics do call into question the
claim that ameliorating poverty will automatically 
prevent child abuse and neglect.
36 Id. at 618. In determining an effective prevention 
program, Professor Garri-
son has argued in favor of orienting the child welfare 
system toward a public health
model that would analyze and determine needed 
reforms, rather than the current
system, which is based on an "acute care" medical 
model where treatment is contem-
plated as "rapid cure and exit." Id. at 595. This 
approach would further the under-
standing of child abuse and neglect as problems 
that require extensive and far-
ranging help for the parent as well as the child, 
and, centrally, emphasize prevention.
See id. at 611-30 (describing the need for prevention of child 
maltreatment); id. at
630-35 (describing what is needed to transform the child welfare 
system into one that
"emphasize[s] long-term, intensive, and multi-faceted interventions").
37 See id. at 621-25 (describing such programs).
38 See FIGHT CRIME: INVEST IN KIDS, supra note 3, 
at 11-18 (same); Garrison, supra
note 12, at 621-30 (describing effective programs).
39 See infra text accompanying notes 141-60.
40 For example, in 1997 and 1998, the RAND 
Corporation undertook a rigorous
study of early childhood intervention programs. 
See LYNN A. KAROLY ET AL., RAND
CORP., INVESTING IN OUR CHILDREN, at iii (1998). The researchers 
defined early child-
hood interventions broadly and found that some 
programs produced short-term ben-
efits for the children and their parents and that 
some of these benefits persisted over
time. See id. at xii-xiii, 63-71. Such benefits included 
"[g]ains in emotional or cogni-
tive development for the child . . . or improved 
parent-child relationships,"
"[ilmprovements in educational process and outcomes 
for the child," "[iIncreased
economic self-sufficiency, initially for the parent 
and later for the child, through
greater labor force participation, higher income, 
and lower welfare usage,"
"Jr] educed levels of criminal activity," and "(i]mprovements 
in health-related indica-
tors, such as child abuse, maternal reproductive 
health, and maternal substance
abuse." Id. at xv.
41 Targeted prevention programs have been shown 
to be cost-effective. See FIGHT
CRIME: INVEST IN KIDS, supra note 3, at 19-21 (describing the 
cost-effectiveness of such
programs). The RAND study also measured savings for 
the state, which the report
defined as savings from participating children, 
who required lower public expendi-
tures later in life and generated greater income 
and thus paid more taxes. See KAROLY
ET AL., supra note 40, at xvi. For example, participating 
children spent less time in
special education programs and, as adults, spent 
less time on welfare or involved in
the criminal justice system. See id. The savings were considerable. 
One program
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Barbara Bennett Woodhouse contends that prevention efforts
should focus on more than the relationship between parent and
child. 42 In her view, prevention should encompass an examination of
the systems surrounding a family, including a child's peer group,
neighborhood, and school. 43  Professor Woodhouse terms this
approach an "environmentalist paradigm," contending that the cur-
rent framework has been partially to blame for the failure to find
effective solutions for reforming the child welfare system. 44 A child's
development depends on all these systems, and therefore child wel-
fare should examine and support these systems, in addition to sup-
porting the family.45
In sum, although there may be some disagreement about the pre-
cise content of prevention efforts,46 the risk factors for child abuse
and neglect are well-documented and include (first and foremost)
poverty, substance abuse, mental illness, violence among adult family
studied cost $12,000 per participant, but generated $25,000 in savings for the child
over the period studied. Id. at xviii. Another program cost $6000 per child and gen-
erated $24,000 in savings. Id. Interestingly, the programs generated the greatest sav-
ings for the state for higher-risk families, whereas lower-risk families in the program
did not generate a net savings to the state. See id. at xix. Additionally, the study
calculated other monetary benefits to society, such as the extra income generated by
participating families, which benefited the overall economy. The study concluded
that in one program, the additional savings were another $24,000, for a total of
$49,000 in benefits to the state compared with the $12,000 cost. See id. at xvii-xix.
For details on all of these findings, see id. at 73-103.
42 See Barbara Bennett Woodhouse, Ecogenerism: An Environmentalist Approach to
Protecting Endangered Children, 12 VA. J. Soc. Pot'v & L. 409, 423 (2005).
43 See id. at 424-26.
44 See id. at 411-12.
45 See id. at 441-46.
46 Interestingly, even those commentators who generally favor aggressive inter-
vention with a bias toward removal also support prevention programs that address the
underlying causes of child abuse and neglect. For example, legal scholars who
strongly favor "child protection" (intervention with a bias toward removal), such as
Elizabeth Bartholet, see ELIzABETH BARTHOLET, NOBODY'S CHILDREN 110 (1999) (argu-
ing that the "most extreme forms of intervention work best for children"), acknowl-
edge that a more far-reaching program to address racial and economic inequities
would be the ideal approach to child welfare. See id. at 6 ("The starting point for
honest and meaningful debate has to be the recognition that racial and social injus-
tice is at the core of child abuse and neglect. The parents who treat their children
badly are themselves victims, and if we want to stop the vicious cycle, we need to
create a society in which there is no miserable underclass, living in conditions which
breed crime, violence, substance abuse, and child maltreatment."). Bartholet
acknowledges that far-reaching programs to address economic and racial discrimina-
tion would be best; she is simply pessimistic (some would say realistic) about the
chances for the adoption of such programs. See id. at 5-6.
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members, single parenthood, teenage parenthood, and a lack of
social supports.4 7 Taking seriously the prevention of child abuse and
neglect would entail addressing these issues and promoting more
targeted programs. The problem, however, is that preventive efforts
have not been widely embraced.
II. A CONCEPTUAL BARRIER TO PREVENTION: FAMILY AUTONOMY
In light of the effectiveness of, and the consensus regarding the
need for, preventive efforts, it is striking that prevention remains at
the margins of child welfare. The reasons for this failure are com-
plex, 48 but as I discuss in this Part, the principal conceptual barrier is
the prevailing notion of family autonomy. As we currently conceive of
family autonomy, freedom from state control is the paramount value
in the relationship between the state and families. In the child welfare
system, this conception plays a pervasive and often insidious role. In
this Part, I describe the dominant understanding of family autonomy
that informs American law and culture. I then explore the over-
whelmingly negative consequences of this conception of family auton-
omy for families at risk of involvement in the child welfare system.
A. Autonomy as Freedom from State Control
There are numerous conceptions of autonomy, but the prevailing
idea of autonomy is the "freedom from" the power of another. Typi-
47 For an excellent summary of the research in this area, see Garrison, supra note
12, at 613-16 & nn.75-90. I certainly do not mean to imply that all parents fitting this
profile abuse or neglect their children. Indeed, the vast majority do not. As Professor
Garrison points out, "we still lack an understanding of the mechanisms that lead to
child maltreatment and the protective factors that lead most parents to resist the dis-
order, but environmental conditions that promote child maltreatment have been
charted in detail." Id. at 612. Additionally, I do not mean to imply that child abuse
does not occur in economically stable families. But there are good reasons to believe
there is not the same likelihood that a parent in an economically stable family engag-
ing in the same behavior as a parent in a low-income family-for example, maltreat-
ing a child due to the parent's substance abuse-will end up in the child welfare
system. For example, the parent in an economically stable family will likely have
greater support systems and less state surveillance than the parent in the low-income
family. SeeRoBERrs, supra note 14, at 32-33 (noting that substance abuse in economi-
cally-stable families typically does not lead to involvement in the child welfare system,
whereas it does in low-income families).
48 For example, costs accrue immediately whereas the benefits accrue over time.
See KAROLY ET AL., supra note 40, at xvi-xix. Additionally, the costs can be borne by
one agency or layer of government while the savings accrue to a different agency or
layer of government. See id. Finally, simple animus toward the poor is also a reason
we have not made these investments.
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cally the "other" is the state, but it can also be another 
person.49 In
this conception of autonomy, rights form a protective 
barrier, isolat-
ing the individual from the other.
50 This view has been extensively
critiqued by feminists and others,
5 1 but it continues to hold great
sway.
Family autonomy as "freedom from" is a pervasive 
feature of
American family law. It is the idea and ideal 
that a stark line divides
the family from the state. A parent's constitutional 
right to the care
and custody of her child,
52 for example, is built upon this conception
49 SeeJennifer Nedelsky, Reconceiving Autonomy: 
Sources, Thoughts and Possibilities, 1
YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 7, 12 (1989) (describing the "deeply 
ingrained sense that indi-
vidual autonomy is to be achieved by erecting 
a wall (of rights) between the individual
and those around him").
50 See id. Concepts of liberty and autonomy 
have long occupied scholars. Here, I
do not intend to engage in the debate over 
the positive and negative liberty frame
originally proposed by Isaiah Berlin, see generally 
ISAAH BERLIN, Two Concepts of Liberty,
in FOUR EssAYs ON LIBERTY 118, 121-34 (1969) (describing 
this frame generally, and
specifically defining negative liberty as "the area 
in which a man can act unobstructed
by others" and positive liberty as "freedom to 
[ ] lead one's prescribed form of life";
alternately as "It)he freedom which consists in being 
one's own master, and the free-
dom which consists in not being prevented from choosing 
as I do by other men"),
and all of its concomitant criticisms, see, e.g., 
Pierre Schlag, An Attack on Categorical
Approaches to Freedom of Speech, 30 UCLA L. REV. 671, 680-93 
(1983) (contesting the
negative and positive liberty distinction on numerous 
grounds and specifically argu-
ing that it is impossible to distinguish liberty 
from the means of its realization because
in almost all circumstances the inability to realize 
liberty will be "attributable at least
in part to the state and thus might logically 
be considered [a] constraint[ ] on lib-
erty"), or assess alternative frameworks, see, e.g., Richard 
H. Fallon, Jr., Two Senses of
Autonomy, 46 STAN. L. REv. 875, 893-901 (1994) (rejecting the 
positive and negative
liberty frame and proposing, in its stead, descriptive 
autonomy and ascriptive auton-
omy, with the former focused on external factors 
that affect personal liberty, and the
latter focused on a "person's sovereignty over her 
moral choices"). Instead, I am con-
cerned with the barrier the current version of 
family autonomy presents to the state
offering support to families before the crisis 
stage. Additionally, although I explore
some of the critiques of family autonomy as positively 
suspect, see infra Part III.A. 1, my
central argument is that even though autonomy 
may well be a descriptively inaccurate
and analytically bereft concept, it has real-world 
effects on the child welfare system. I
am concerned with these effects.
51 See, e.g., MICHAEL J. SANDEL, LIBERALISM AND 
THE LIMITS OF JUSTICE (1982);
CHARLES TAYLOR, PHILOSOPHY AND THE 
HUMAN SCIENCES 187-210 (1985); Linda C.
McClain, "Atomistic Man" Revisited: Liberalism, 
Connection, and Feminist Jurisprudence, 65
S. CAL. L. REV. 1171, 1174-75 (1992).
52 See, e.g., Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 
205, 233-34 (1972); Prince v. Massachu-
setts, 321 U.S. 158, 166-70 (1944); Pierce v. Soc'y of Sisters, 
268 U.S. 510, 534-35
(1925); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 401 (1923); 
see also David D. Meyer, The
Paradox of Family Privacy, 53 VAND. L. REv. 527, 544-48 (2000) 
(describing these cases
in the larger context of the Supreme Court's 
family privacy jurisprudence). The
parens patriae doctrine, which empowers the 
state to intervene in families to protect
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of family autonomy. The state must make a heightened 
showing of
harm to a child before removing the child from 
the custody of her
parent.53 In this way, family autonomy serves 
to protect family integ-
rity, ensuring that the state will not remove a child 
simply because the
state believes another parent would provide 
a superior environment
for the child.
Family autonomy ostensibly creates a buffer 
zone between the
state and parents with respect to child-rearing 
decisions. Absent exi-
gent circumstances, the state leaves parents alone 
to make their own
decisions regarding child rearing.
54 This freedom protects a diversity
of decisionmaking among families by preventing 
the state from impos-
ing a uniform view of parenting on all families.
5 5 It thus safeguards
cultural and moral diversity in matters of 
child rearing, 56 which in
turn serves democratic principles.
7
This antitotalitarian role for the family has 
been recognized by
the Supreme Court. In Pierce v. Society of Sisters,
58 the Court held that a
parent has a constitutionally protected right 
to select a school of her
children, is predicated on the idea that state 
intervention is justifiable only when the
parents have stopped caring for the child themselves. 
See Gary B. Melton & Megan
Sullivan, The Concept of Entitlement and Its Incompatibility with 
American Legal Culture, in
VISIONS OF ENTITLEMENT 47, 47-48 (Mary A. Jensen & 
Stacie G. Goffin eds., 1993).
53 This is true as a matter of constitutional 
law, see Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U.S.
246, 255 (1978), as well as of state statutory law, see, e.g., 
CAL. WEUV. & INST. CODE
§ 300 (West 2005). But see COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. § 
19-3-403 (West 2005 & Supp.
2006) (using "best interests" standard for removal of child).
54 See Carl E. Schneider, Moral Discourse and 
the Transformation of American Family
Law, 83 MICH. L. REv. 1803, 1835-39 (1985) (discussing 
the legal tradition of nonin-
terference in the family). But see infra text accompanying 
notes 101-04 (discussing
how parental decisions are not, in fact, made 
autonomously of the state because (1)
the state determines the broad contours 
of familial decisions, and (2) the state itself
has created the system in which parents 
are allowed to make certain decisions).
55 See Barbara Bennett Woodhouse, "Who 
Owns the Child?": Meyer and Pierce and
the Child as Property, 33 WM. & MARY L. REv. 
995, 1091 (1992).
56 See Emily Buss, Allocating Developmental Control 
Among Parent, Child and the State,
2004 U. CHt. LEGAL F. 27, 27 (noting that leaving 
the upbringing of children to pri-
vate actors 'would comport with our commitment 
to pluralism by allowing one gener-
ation to perpetuate its own diversity, 
and even expand upon it, in the next
generation"); see also Carl E. Schneider, Rights Discourse 
and Neonatal Euthanasia, 76
CAL. L. REv. 151, 160 (1988) ("[T]here is a sense in 
which the whole rights approach
itself is an elaborately constructed means 
of promoting pluralism.").
57 See Anne C. Dailey, Constitutional Privacy and the 
Just Family, 67 TUL. L. REv. 955,
959 (1993) ("The family's role in nourishing and sustaining 
diverse moral traditions is
what in part distinguishes our liberal 
democracy from totalitarian political
regimes.... As the locus of potential political 
resistance, the family acts as an impor-
tant institutional check on the power of the 
state to mold citizens in its own image.").
58 268 U.S. 510 (1925).
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choice for her child and, therefore, is not required to send the child
to public school.5 9 In so holding, the Court stated that
[t]he fundamental theory of liberty upon which all governments in
this Union repose excludes any general power of the State to stand-
ardize its children .... The child is not the mere creature of the
State; those who nurture him and direct his destiny have the right,
coupled with the high duty, to recognize and prepare him for addi-
tional obligations. 60
In addition to determining where to send a child to school,
parental decisionmaking power is typically understood to include, for
example, the authority to make medical decisions for the child 6' and
the authority to decide what religion, if any, the child should follow. 62
The state defers to these parental decisions, assuming parental
behavior does not transgress pre-set norms. If there is such a trans-
gression and it results in child abuse and neglect, the state intervenes
in the family, often removing the child, even if only temporarily, and
placing her in an alternative home.68 Before a parent crosses this line,
however, family autonomy protects a diversity of decisionmaking
among families.
In addition to these legal manifestations-family integrity and
parental decisionmaking authority-family autonomy as "freedom
from" the state resonates on cultural and political registers. 64 It
presents a neat story, offering a clear line of demarcation between the
state and the family. This plot line is both easy to convey to an audi-
59 See id. at 534-35.
60 Id. at 535.
61 See 70 CJ.S. Physicians § 116 (2005) ("[fln the absence of an emergency, an
operation performed on a child without the consent of a parent . . . is a legal
wrong.").
62 See Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 229-34 (1972); Pierce, 268 U.S. at 533-35.
63 For example, a parent may choose how much television a child watches, but if
a parent leaves a young child alone in the home in front of a television while she goes
to work, this may be considered child endangerment. In that situation, the state no
longer defers to parental decisionmaking because the decision of the parent has
transgressed certain limits. But within these limits, family autonomy protects a diverse
range of decisions by parents.
64 Family autonomy is embraced by both liberals and conservatives, as well as, of
course, libertarians. See, e.g., Marc A. Fey, Parental Rights in Education, http://www.
family.org/socialissues/A000000380.cfm (last visited Feb. 22, 2007) (stating that
Focus on the Family "steadfastly oppose[s] any and all domestic and international
efforts of social parenting movements that would define children as wards of the
state" and that "the tentacles of the modern welfare state have muddied [the] idea [of
the state as parent), threatening both parental rights and democracy itself"); see also
BARTHOLET, supra note 46, at 7 (arguing that a cult of family autonomy is perpetuated
and protected by both ends of the political spectrum).
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ence-"the state cannot tell you how to raise your 
child"-and fits
within a widely accepted narrative of the all-powerful, 
intrusive state
that must be kept at arm's length.
The rhetorical appeal of family autonomy echoes 
in the pecu-
liarly American iconography of self-sufficiency. 
"Why help the poor?
Let them help themselves." Indeed, as a society 
we have pathologized
the need for state support.
65 Nancy Fraser and Linda Gordon
describe this vilification of dependency, arguing 
that although depen-
dency has not always had pejorative overtones,
66 today
65 Annette Appell argues that pathologizing 
child abuse is part of a larger dis-
course that locates responsibility for poverty and 
its related problems in the individ-
ual, rather than society. See Annette R. Appell, 
Disposable Mothers, Deployable Children, 9
MICH. J. RACE & L. 421, 421 (book review) ("The dominant 
discourse about poverty
and racism has changed significantly in the past 
decade to reflect a view that poverty,
problems attendant to poverty, and racial affiliation 
are matters of individual choice
that have individualized solutions. In this discourse, 
poverty, homelessness, child neg-
lect, and economically blighted and isolated communities 
reflect personal pathology;
White supremacy is a relic and all race distinctions 
are bad. These beliefs are mani-
fested in federal legislation that limits welfare 
benefits, promotes adoption of poor
children, and removes barriers to transracial 
adoption. A common denominator of
this legislation is the notion that poor (Black) families are 
pathological so they should
be discouraged from having children and the 
children that they do have would be
better off with other parents.").
66 See Nancy Fraser & Linda Gordon, A Genealogy 
of Dependency: Tracing a Keyword
of the U.S. Welfare State, 19 SIGNS 309, 312-14 (1994) (describing 
pre-industrial use of
the term to refer to the condition of individuals 
who relied on work to earn a living,
rather than land ownership, which provided 
the owner with a living without labor-
ing). In the United States, "the absence of a hierarchical 
social tradition in which
subordination was understood to be structural, 
not characterological, facilitated hos-
tility to public support for the poor." Id. at 
320; accord id. at 312 (describing "four
registers in which the meanings of dependency 
reverberate": economic (reliance on
another or an institution for subsistence); sociolegal status 
(the absence of a separate
legal identity); political (being subject to an external source 
of power, such as a col-
ony); and moral/psychological (an individual character 
trait)). As a result, a depen-
dency on the state for economic support came 
to be seen as a form of individual
pathology. Fraser and Gordon argue that with 
the demise of legal and political
dependency (for example, coverture no longer exists), and 
now that women typically
work or at least are able to work, thus ending the 
economic dependency of wives, "all
dependency is suspect, and independence is 
enjoined upon everyone." Id. at 324.
Similarly, with the ending of Jim Crow laws, "[w]hatever 
dependency remains.., can
be interpreted as the fault of individuals." Id. at 
325. This belief holds true despite
the fact that dependency can run in both directions. 
As Jason DeParle describes
sharecropping Mississippi, "[wlhile dependency was a word 
typically tied to the region's
poor blacks, dependency ran both ways; perhaps 
nowhere was the prosperity of the
white elite as dependent on perpetuating a large 
black underclass." JASoN DEPARLE,
AMERICAN DR
F AM 27 (2004). And this is true even though dependency 
on the state
could help some individuals become more independent. 
See id. at 36 ("IT]he receipt
of welfare reduced [a recipient's] reliance on men, 
so it decreased the predatory
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[ d] ependency ... is an ideological term. In current U.S. policy dis-
course it usually refers to the condition of poor women with chil-
dren who maintain their families with neither a male breadwinner
nor an adequate wage and who rely for economic support on a
stingy and politically unpopular government program called Aid to
Families with Dependent Children (AFDC). . . . [N]aming the
problems of poor, solo-mother families as dependency tends to make
them appear to be individual problems, as much moral or psycho-
logical as economic. The term carries strong emotive and visual
associations and a powerful pejorative charge. In current debates,
the expression welfare dependency evokes the image of "the welfare
mother," often figured as a young, unmarried black woman (per-
haps even a teenager) of uncontrolled sexuality.67
In sum, family autonomy as freedom from state control stands as
the prevailing conception of the relationship between the state and
families. As I argue below, this narrative of autonomous families is
largely inaccurate-the state both supports and intervenes in the lives
of all families.68 But despite this descriptive inaccuracy, there is a per-
vasive belief, reflected in law and culture, that families can be and are
autonomous of the state. The persistence of this ideal is particularly
problematic in the context of the child welfare system.
violence in her life. It also bolstered her leverage in a rigged labor market designed
for exploitation. Now she had options besides chopping cotton and washing white
people's clothes."); Fraser & Gordon, supra, at 311 (describing how economic sup-
ports would enable women to leave abusive relationships).
67 Fraser & Gordon, supra note 66, at 311; accord Personal Responsibility and
Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996 § 103(a)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 601 (a) (2)
(2000) (reinforcing the image of dependency as pathological by stating that one of
the goals of the new Temporary Assistance to Needy Families (TANF) program was to
"end the dependence of needy parents on government benefits by promoting job
preparation, work, and marriage"); MARTHA ALBERTsON FINEMAN, THE AUTONOMY
MYTH, at xiv (2004) (describing the "iconic construct of the autonomous individual").
The term "dependency," with this weighted history, is also central to child welfare.
State statutes establishing the child welfare system refer to "dependency and neglect"
as bases for intervention in the family. See, e.g., CAL. WELF. & INST. CoDE § 300 (West
2005). For an argument that self-reliance need not be caricatured and is a useful
concept, see Amy L. Wax, Social Welfare, Human Dignity, and the Puzzle of What We Owe
Each Other, 27 HARv.J.L. & Pua. PoL'V 121,128 (2003) (discussing early reformers and
noting that "they understood very well that the term 'self-reliance' was not to be taken
literally, but rather was a shorthand for a particular type of constructive role in com-
munity and economic life" and further arguing that "[cihampions of welfare reform
thus cede no important ground to opponents by acknowledging that self-sufficiency is
never complete and that economic independence for poor families-as for everyone
else-cannot be all or nothing").
68 See infra Part III.A.1.
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B. Autonomy in the Child Welfare System
To be sure, the "freedom from" conception of family autonomy
provides some benefits for families by protecting family integrity and a
diversity of decisionmaking. But for families at risk of involvement in
the child welfare system, the prevailing "freedom from" conception
jeopardizes these very benefits.
The "freedom from" conception informs the legal framework
governing the child welfare system, and establishes that the state lacks
authority to intervene in a family until the parents cross a pre-set line
governing parental behavior.69 At this crisis stage, the state is author-
ized to intervene to protect the child. Although a reluctance to inter-
vene can help protect family integrity, the flipside is that it helps
create both a legal and cultural environment that largely absolves the
state of affirmative responsibility for the well-being of families.70
Both economically stable families and low-income families have
the same basic needs, including food, housing, child care, health care,
and reliable transportation. Due to their greater financial resources,
economically stable families may be able to satisfy these needs using
their own resources. By contrast, although many low-income families
69 See GUGGENHEIM, supra note 31, at 36-37, 181-85; ROBERTS, supra note 14, at
14-19; Eichner, supra note 26, at 449-50 (describing what she calls the "dominant
model of child welfare"); Woodhouse, supra note 42, at 423 ("The intact and func-
tioning family is proudly autonomous. Provision of services and support is the excep-
tion to the rule of autonomy, and generally must be tied to some finding or admission
of family failure and dysfunction.... Thus, the model depends on parental fault as a
predicate for state engagement in the life of a child.").
70 1 do not mean to suggest that the state provides no tangible support for low-
income families. Of course there are some programs designed to help such families.
See, e.g., Temporary Assistance to Needy Families, 42 U.S.C. §§ 601-619 (2000); Hous-
ing and Community Development Act of 1974, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1437-1437z-7 (2000)
(establishing HUD § 8 voucher program); Child Care and Development Block Grant
Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. §§ 9858-9858q (2000). My view is that such programs do not
come close to meeting the needs of families. See, e.g., ANNE L. ALSTOTT, No Exr 206
(2004) (describing the meager benefits available to families); Clare Huntington, Wel-
fare Reform and Child Care: A Proposal for State Legislation, 6 CORNELLJ.L. & PUB. POL'Y
95, 100-05 (1996) (describing the vast unmet need for high quality subsidized child
care, even in the wake of federal and state investments). I recognize that others,
based on their own normative views, consider current programs at best sufficient, and
at worst already too burdensome on the taxpayer and an inappropriate expenditure
of government funds. See, e.g., CHARLES MURRAY, LOSING GROUND 154-77, 196-236
(1984) (arguing that public assistance programs should be eliminated because they
encourage joblessness, out-of-wedlock births, and dependence on state aid); JAMES L.
PAYNE, OVERCOMING WELFARE 10-11 (1998) (arguing that the welfare system does not
reduce poverty and encourages "dependent and dysfunctional lifestyles").
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benefit from extensive social networks that enable them to survive, 7 1
some needs require money and for these, the state may be the best, or
perhaps the only, source of assistance. 72
But the "freedom from" conception of family autonomy means
the state does not assume an affirmative responsibility for the well-
being of families. As discussed below, the state actually does support
all families in numerous ways. 73 But the persistent idea and ideal that
families exist independently of the state, although simply untrue, con-
tributes to the belief that the state need not address the issues facing
low-income families, even though these issues are correlated with
higher rates of child abuse and neglect.7 4
The post hoc child welfare system born of this hands-off, crisis-
oriented approach to families adversely affects children and parents.
By the time the state intervenes, the children have already been
abused or neglected, or are at considerable risk for abuse or neglect,
71 See, e.g., DEPARLE, supra note 66, at 79 (describing such support networks).
72 See MAR-Y ANN GLENDON, THE TRANSFORMATION OF FAMILY LAW 308 (1989)
("There is at present in legal discourse little recognition that family members may
need nurturing environments as much as they need rights, or that families themselves
may need surrounding circumstances in order to function at their best. By systemati-
cally-though for the most part unintentionally-ignoring the 'little platoons' from
which families and individuals have always drawn emotional and material sustenance,
modern legal systems probably contribute to some extent to their atrophy."); Hunt-
ington, supra note 11, at 664-70 (describing the need for tangible assistance); see also
Appell, supra note 65, at 465 (discussing the implications of viewing problems of fami-
lies as personal and not tied to larger issues of "huge geographic, economic, and
racial barriers to social movement").
73 See infra text accompanying notes 96-107.
74 Numerous caveats apply here. The majority of low-income parents do not
abuse or neglect their children. Some economically stable parents do. And some
parents are wrongly treated by the child welfare system and should not have had their
children removed. See ROBERTS, supra note 14, at 92-99 (describing evidence of racial
bias in child welfare, leading to the overremoval of African-American children from
their homes). But even taking all this into account, as I noted above, see supra notes
17-20, 35-41 and accompanying text, there is an undeniable correlation between
poverty and child abuse and neglect. In light of the economics of low-wage jobs that
force parents to work multiple jobs, the persistence of high crime rates in many
neighborhoods, the lack of quality child care, the dearth of affordable, quality hous-
ing, the high cost of transportation, the lack of positive role models, and countless
other forces, it is no wonder many of the basic needs of children are left unattended
in low-income families. And sometimes this inattention crosses the line into abuse
and neglect. I do not mean to suggest that economically stable families do not strug-
gle with at least some of these issues, particularly substance abuse. But, rightly or
wrongly, the substance abuse of economically-stable families typically does not lead to
involvement in the child welfare system, whereas it does for low-income families. See
ROBERTS, supra note 14, at 32-33.
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and the lives of the parents likely have deteriorated 
to such a low that
state intervention is perceived to be necessary. 
In other words, the
damage has already been done, both to children 
and to the parent-
child relationship.
75
Further, the relationship between families and the 
state has also
been damaged. With the impending threat 
of removing children
from the home, there is a fundamentally adversarial 
relationship
between the state and families. This hinders 
cooperation and high-
lights the power imbalance between the state 
and families. At this
point, the state's posture towards families is inevitably 
intrusive and
judgmental.
Thus, for poor families, the "freedom from" conception 
of family
autonomy means that the benefits of the conception-protection 
for
family integrity and a diversity of decisionmaking-are 
actually com-
promised by the very conception itself. The 
prevailing conception
limits state responsibility for families. But without 
state support, a
family is more likely to fail, thus opening the door 
for the most intru-
sive form of state intervention-the removal 
of children and place-
ment in foster care, which threatens both family 
integrity and parental
decisionmaking authority.
C. The Traditional Trade-Off Between State Support
and Self-Determination
State support, however, is not uncomplicated. 
Both historically
and today, the provision of state support, especially 
for low-income
families, has been accompanied by conditions 
that require the forfei-
ture of at least some authority over family decisions. 
This practice is
the basis for an important and recurrent critique 
of state aid: that
increased support for families inevitably leads 
to increased regulation
of those families, 6 especially for families not 
within the dominant
75 See Huntington, supra note 11, at 661 
nn.122- 2 6 (describing studies demon-
strating poor long-term outcomes for children 
in foster care).
76 See, e.g., Katherine M. Franke, Taking 
Care, 76 CHI.-KENT L. REv. 1541, 1544
(2001) ("The granting of rights and the recognition 
of public responsibility for
dependency is unlikely to usher in a domain 
of unrestrained autonomy that some
liberal projects promise. Rather, to shift responsibility 
for dependency outside the
family is to exchange one practice of rule-the 
private family-for another set of
regulatory governance practices, those imbued 
in the state and the market."); Jill
Elaine Hasday, Parenthood Divided: A Legal 
History of the Bifurcated Law of Parental Rela-
tions, 90 GEo. L.J. 299, 303, 357-71 (2002) (noting that 
ostensibly supportive pro-
grams, such as welfare, often come at a great cost to family 
autonomy, and calling for
a debate over "whether and to what extent the provision 
of welfare should change the
legal rules of parenthood") [hereinafter Hasday, 
Parenthood Divided]; Deborah L.
15o6 NO' X~r, .A......v..8
group.7 7 I understand this as the "one-way ratchet" 
concern. When
the state aids families, it also regulates the conduct 
of such families.
As Katherine Franke describes the concern in the 
context of the
debate over public responsibility for care work provided 
in the home,
the "delicate act of translation-from private 
need to public obliga-
tion-demands acute sensitivity to the ways in 
which public responsi-
bility inaugurates a new and complex encounter 
with a broad array of
public preferences that deprive dependent subjects of primary 
stew-
ardship over the ways in which their 
needs are met."178
Historically, the exchange of self-determination 
for state support
was particularly explicit and far-reaching. For example, 
British social
theorist T.H. Marshall contended that citizenship 
rights could be
Rhode, Feminism and the State, 107 HARV. L. REv. 
1181, 1184-85 (1994) (describing the
feminist argument that "even state policies 
ostensibly designed to assist women have
institutionalized their subordination" but noting 
that this critique glosses over racial
and class differences among women, which themselves 
are "equally powerful in order-
ing social relations"); see alsoJill Elaine Hasday, The Canon 
of Family Law, 57 STAN. L.
REv. 825, 892-98 (2004) (describing how laws that affect 
low-income families are cate-
gorized as welfare law and thus not seen as contributing 
to a dual system of family law,
in which one set of rules governs economically-stable 
families and another, more
onerous, set of rules governs low-income families).
77 See Rhode, supra note 76, at 1188 ("For any subordinate 
group, the state is a
primary source of both repression and assistance 
in the struggle for equality."). Peggy
Cooper Davis describes two dichotomous views 
of the state: one of the state as an
enforcer of shared values, and another of 
the state as a power that must be con-
strained, permitting families to form their own 
values without undue state influence.
Peggy Cooper Davis, Contested Images of the Family Values: 
The Role of the State, 107 HARv.
L. REv. 1348, 1348 (1994). Cooper Davis argues for the 
latter vision, grounding her
argument in a historical understanding of 
the Fourteenth Amendment. She con-
tends that the antislavery tradition of human 
dignity and family liberty animated the
principles of liberty and citizenship in the Fourteenth 
Amendment. Id. at 1349-53.
She argues that the Fourteenth Amendment 
requires "that each person be given a
measure of autonomy appropriate to the thinking, 
morally conscious character of
humankind: autonomy sufficient to allow 
self-definition and substantial moral
choice." Id. at 1349. Cooper Davis describes 
the multiple forms of oppression of
slaves, but in particular the deprivation of family 
autonomy, noting that slaves entered
into informal familial arrangements, but that such 
arrangements received no legal or
social protection. Id. at 1363. As Cooper Davis argues,
[t]o think of family liberty as a guarantee offered 
in response to slavery's
denials of natal connection is to understand it, 
not as an end in itself, but as
a means to full personhood. People are not 
meant to be socialized to uni-
form, externally imposed values. People are 
to be able to form families and
other intimate communities within which children 
might be differently
socialized and from which adults would bring 
different values to the demo-
cratic process.
Id. at 1371.
78 Franke, supra note 76, at 1541.
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divided into three categories: civil, political, and social. 79 He defined
civil rights as "composed of the rights necessary for individual free-
dom,"' 0 political rights as "the right to participate in the exercise of
political power,""' and social rights as "the whole range from the right
to a modicum of economic welfare and security to the right to share
to the full in the social heritage and to live the life of a civilised being
according to the standards prevailing in the society."82 According to
Marshall, the traditional practice was that if an individual obtained
social rights by receiving support from the state, that person suffered a
de jure forfeiture of political rights and a de facto forfeiture of civil
rights.8 3 Today, although the exchange of civil or political rights for
social rights is far less explicit, the idea that recipients of state aid are
somehow lesser citizens is still implicit in so much of the debate sur-
rounding social welfare programs.8 4
To be sure, all government support is typically accompanied by
some form of regulation or conditions, but when the state supports
low-income families, the regulation and conditions can be particularly
79 See T.H. Marshall, Citizenship and Social Class (1963), reprinted in THE CITIZEN-
SHIP DEBATES 93, 94 (Gershon Shafir ed., 1998).
80 Id.
81 Id.
82 Id.
83 See id. at 100 (describing the loss of political rights through legal disen-
franchisement and the practical loss of civil rights through internment in a work-
house). Other examples abound. See ALEXANDER KEYSSAR, THE RIGHT TO VOTE
61-65, 271-72 (2000) (describing the legal disenfranchisement of paupers in United
States, still in operation until the 1960s); Marshall, supra note 79, at 100 (describing
Factory Acts).
84 See, e.g., MURRAY, supra note 70, at 154-77, 196-236 (contending that state aid
encourages unemployment, single parenthood, and government dependence);
PAYNE, supra note 70, at 10-11 (arguing that state aid does not decrease poverty and
instead encourages "dependent and dysfunctional lifestyles"); Daniel J. Mitchell,
Taxes, Deficits, and Economic Growth, THE HERITAGE FOUND., May 14, 1996, http://www.
heritage.org/Research/Taxes/h565.cfm, at I (opining that public assistance under-
mines productive behavior); Robert Rector, Welfare: A System in Need of Change-Spend-
ing on Current Programs Promotes Behavioral Poverty, ST. Louis POsT-DISPATCH, June 27,
1995, at 15B (commenting that the WELFARE system creates perverse incentives that
promote self-destructive behavior and dependency on the state). Indeed, as scholars
describe it, the current debate over social welfare programs is whether to place claim-
ants in the historical box (paupers whose civil and political rights should be limited
because of their dependency) or to create a new box in which social rights are seen as
a means of obtaining full civil and political rights. See, e.g., CHAD ALAN GOLDBERG,
CITIZENS AND PAUPERS: RELIEF, RIGHTS, AND RACE FROM THE FREEDMEN'S BUREAUi TO
WORKFARE (forthcoming 2007); Chad Alan Goldberg, Contesting the Status of Relief
Workers During the New Deal The Worker's Alliance of America and the Works Progress Admin-
istration, 29 Soc. Sci. HIST. 337, 361-62 (2005).
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onerous. Programs intended to benefit the poor 
are generally based
on a philosophy that seeks to modify behavior in 
exchange for bene-
fits.85 Researchers often focus on certain behaviors that, in their 
view,
contribute to a decrease in social mobility, including 
not graduating
from high school, having a child out of wedlock or 
before a person is
able to support the child, not working or actively 
seeking work, and
not abiding by the law.8
6 Thus, the state typically ties support to the
modification of these behaviors.
87
These behavior modification conditions can 
take very intrusive
forms, deeply infringing upon familial self-determination.
88 For
example, historically the receipt of welfare assistance 
rendered a fam-
ily vulnerable to unannounced visits in the middle 
of the night by case
workers. The purpose of the visit was to ensure 
there was not a wage
85 Cf Morgan B. Ward Doran & Dorothy E. Roberts, Welfare 
Reform and Families in
the Child Welfare System, 61 MD. L. REv. 386, 391-400, 405-17 
(2002) (describing and
criticizing the behavior modification philosophy 
of TANF and the child welfare
system).
86 See Erol Ricketts & Isabel Sawhill, Defining and Measuring 
the Underclass, 7 J.
POL'Y ANALYSIS & MGMT. 316, 321 (1988).
87 Additionally, although targeted prevention 
programs are effective in reducing
child abuse and neglect, programs directed at specific 
populations, rather than those
generally available to all, typically come 
with greater conditions. See Lawrence R.
Jacobs & Theda Skocpol, Studying Inequality 
and American Democracy: Findings and Chal-
lenges, in INEQUALITY AND AMERICAN DEMoCRACY 
214, 225 (Lawrence R. Jacobs &
Theda Skocpol, eds., 2005) (" [S] ocial programs that 
reach broad categories of people
and deliver benefits as a matter of 'rights' 
can enhance citizens' sense that they are
deserving recipients of public succor and 
encourage them to participate fully in the
polity. By contrast, programs that deliver 
meager supports to slices of people who
must go through complicated, demeaning 
procedures to qualify can leave citizens
feeling like disempowered, undeserving recipients.").
88 See VVIANA A. ZELIZER, THE SOCIAL MEANING 
OF MONEY 119-98 (1994)
(describing changing approaches to controlling the 
spending of low-income families
as well as the spending on low-income families). By 
contrast, programs that could
also be considered state aid-such as social 
security payments to nonworking, wid-
owed spouses-typically have not been accompanied 
by such extensive regulation.
See Hasday, Parenthood Divided, supra note 
76, at 357-71 (comparing Social Security
with TANF benefits as one example of the 
"dual normative regime" that does not
require economically stable families to relinquish 
family autonomy in exchange for
benefits but does require such relinquishment 
of low-income families). The concern
about the power of the state to control recipients 
can be traced at least as far back as
Charles Reich's seminal articles in the mid-1960s. 
See Charles A. Reich, Individual
Rights and Social Welfare: The Emerging Legal Issues, 74 YALE 
L.J. 1245, 1251-56 (1965);
Charles A. Reich, The New Property, 73 YALE 
L.J. 733, 756-71 (1964) [hereinafter
Reich, The New Property]. Reich contended that welfare 
recipients, who were depen-
dent on the payments for their livelihood, 
were vulnerable to the state and therefore
the welfare payments (and other forms of government 
supports) should be subject to
the same legal protections as traditional real 
property. Id. at 779-86.
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earner (in other words, a man) present who could be supporting 
the
family.89 The Supreme Court upheld similar visits, 
concluding that a
welfare recipient, by accepting state assistance, 
agreed to the state's
involvement in her family.
90
In a more modern example, the receipt of welfare 
is often tied to
the regulation of women's sexuality. In California, 
for example, if a
child is born to a woman who has been receiving 
assistance for the
previous ten months, the woman will not receive 
additional support
for the child unless the child was "conceived as 
a result of contracep-
tive failure if the parent was using an intrauterine device, 
a Norplant,
or the sterilization of either parent."
91 Moreover, intrusive conditions
have not been applied equally, but rather first and 
foremost to women
of color. For example, there is a history of forced 
sterilization pro-
grams for women of color and American Indians, 
justified in part by
the "dependency" of these women.
92
The "freedom from" conception of family autonomy 
is partly
responsible for the mindset that permits these 
conditions to be
imposed. Because the prevailing conception presupposes 
that a fam-
ily can operate without state support, it helps 
create an environment
in which state support is seen as deviant. It is this 
deviancy that opens
the door to behavior modification conditions. Thus, 
if a family is per-
ceived to be economically stable and therefore "independent" 
of the
state, the state largely leaves parents alone to 
make decisions about
child rearing. But if a family needs state support, 
it risks losing state
deference to parental decisionmaking.
The dominant "freedom from" conception of family 
autonomy
means that families take care of themselves with 
minimal state sup-
port, but also minimal state intervention. This 
has particularly detri-
mental effects for families at risk of involvement 
in the child welfare
89 See DEPARLE, supra note 66, at 37 (describing such "visits").
90 See, e.g., Wyman v.James, 400 U.S. 309, 317 (1971) (rejecting 
a Fourth Amend-
ment challenge to daytime visits where the mother 
was given advance notice); see also
id. at 328 (Douglas, J., dissenting) ("The central question 
is whether the government
by force of its largesse has the power to 'buy 
up' rights guaranteed by the Constitu-
tion." (quoting Note, Unconstitutional Conditions, 73 HARV. 
L. REV. 1595, 1599
(1960))). For a more recent example, see Sanchez v. San Diego, 
464 F.3d 916, 919 (9th
Cir. 2006) (upholding requirement in county's welfare law that 
permitted an investi-
gator to make an unannounced visit to determine, 
inter alia, (1) assets of claimant, (2)
presence of dependent child, and (3) absence of co-parent).
91 CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 11450.04(b) (3) (West 2005). 
There are also excep-
tions in that law for children conceived 
as the result of rape or incest. See id.
§ 11450.04(b)(1)-( 2 ).
92 See DOROTHY ROBERTS, KILLING THE BLAC1K 
BODY 89-98 (1997); Nancy
Ehrenreich, The Colonization of the Womb, 43 DuKF L.J. 492, 515-16 
(1993).
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system because it creates a post hoc, rather than a prevention-ori-
ented, system of child welfare. A system that focuses on prevention by
offering additional supports to families must take seriously the con-
cern about increased state regulation of familial decisionmaking. The
challenge, therefore, is to reconfigure the relationship between the
state and families such that the state seeks to invest in families but
does so in a way that fosters rather than hinders familial self-determi-
nation. This will require a reconception of the prevailing conception
of family autonomy.
III. RECONCEIVING FAMILY AUTONOMY
Adopting a prevention-oriented approach to child welfare will
require a new conception of family autonomy. This conception must
center on the need for state support, but not condition that support
on a forfeiture of familial self-determination. In this Part, I first pro-
pose that instead of placing freedomfrom state control at the center of
family autonomy, we encourage engagement with the state. Such
engagement is built upon the mutual dependency of the state and
families. I then explore how this engagement need not come at the
price of familial self-determination. To demonstrate that a recon-
ceived family autonomy is possible, I offer three examples of innova-
tive programs that embody the principles I endorse.
My aim is to identify a model of family-state relations that will best
persuade the state to make the necessary investments in prevention.
This structural argument is required because the state cannot be com-
pelled as a matter of legal obligation to provide support. Some schol-
ars have advanced such an argument in the context of the child
welfare system, contending that the state possesses an affirmative legal
obligation to support parents by addressing the underlying issues of
child abuse and neglect.9 3 Locating an affirmative obligation of aid is
93 For example, acknowledging that the Federal Constitution is an unlikely
source of an affirmative right to state support, some scholars have tried to locate an
affirmative obligation in the parens patriae authority of the state. See, e.g., Kay P.
Kindred, God Bless the Child: Poor Children, Patens Patriae, and a State Obligation to Pro-
vide Assistance, 57 OHIO ST. L.J. 519, 534-36 (1996); Sarah Ramsey & Daan Braveman,
"Let Them Starve" Government's Obligation to Children in Poverty, 68 TEMP. L. REV. 1607,
1631, 1634-35 (1995). Although these are creative and important arguments, I
believe such arguments will founder. The current conception of parens patriae
authority in the child welfare system is that when there is evidence of abuse or neglect
of a child, the state is authorized to intervene in the family and act as the "primary
protector of children from abuse and neglect." Judith Areen, Intervention Between Par-
ent and Child: A Reappraisal of the State's Role in Child Neglect and Abuse Cases, 63 GEo. L.J.
887, 893 (1975); accord SANFORD N. KATZ, FAMILY LAW IN AMERicA 132 (2003) ("Histor-
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a steeply uphill battle, however, and not one I intend to wage. Rather,
the arguments for social and economic aid are best couched in terms
of structural relations, not legal obligation. 94
A. Engaging with the State
The central goal of family autonomy should be to promote famil-
ial self-determination, which includes both family integrity and defer-
ence to parental decisionmaking. As I explored above, for families at
risk of involvement in the child welfare system, the prevailing concep-
tion of family autonomy actually jeopardizes family integrity and thus
parental decisionmaking. 95 For such families, engaging with the state
is a better way of protecting familial self-determination. Targeted pre-
vention programs as well as general antipoverty efforts will enable a
parent to better care for her child, thus reducing the chance that a
ically the state, the ultimate parent who looks after all the children in society under
the parens patriae concept, has a right to subject parents to public scrutiny and legal
examination."). Thus, parens patriae authority has generally been understood to
empower the state to intervene to protect a child, but not to impose a concomitant duty
to intervene. See P.W. v. Kan. Dep't Soc. & Rehab. Servs., 877 P.2d 430, 436 (Kan.
1994) ("The doctrine of parens patriae empowers, but does not impose a duty on, the
State to act on behalf of the welfare of those unable to care for themselves."); Ramsey
& Braveman, supra, at 1635 (noting that any language in judicial opinions appearing
to impose an affirmative obligation through the parens patriae doctrine "seems to be
mainly rhetorical"). Moreover, the authority has not been understood to require any
particular manner of intervention, such as addressing poverty rather than simply
removing the child. Finally, it is well-established that an individual cannot raise a
substantive due process claim against the state for the failure to prevent child abuse
and neglect. See DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep't of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189,
191 (1989).
94 Other scholars have also proposed new models for reworking the relationship
between families and the state, typically arguing that state support plays an important
role in ensuring the well-being of families. See, e.g., ALsTo-rr, supra note 70, at 208-11
(summarizing her argument that society must care for parents as a way of ensuring
the well-being of children); FINEMAN, supra note 67, at 218-40 (advancing the argu-
ment for state support of care giving); ROBERTS, supra note 92, at 308-12 (proposing a
new conception of liberty, which "includes not only the negative proscription against
government coercion, but also the affirmative duty of government to protect the indi-
vidual's personhood from degradation and to facilitate the processes of choice and
self-determination," thus calling upon the state to provide "subsistence benefits, drug
treatment, and medical care"); Eichner, supra note 26, at 463-65 (calling for a "sup-
portive state" approach to child welfare); Barbara Bennett Woodhouse, Refraining the
Debate About the Socialization of Children: An Environmentalist Paradigm, 2004 U. CHI.
LEGAL F. 85, 85 ("1 would replace the paradigm in which parents and the state are
pitted against each other with a paradigm in which parents and the state act as part-
ners in ensuring an environment conducive to children's healthy development.").
95 See supra notes 84-92 and accompanying text.
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crisis will occur and the state will remove the child from the parent's
home. Thus, the provision of state support for families will not
weaken family integrity, and instead stands only to bolster it by giving
parents a better chance of being able to raise their own children.
Just as families need the state, however, the state also needs fami-
lies. Thus my overarching frame is one of mutual dependency: Fami-
lies need state support to function, and the state needs functioning
families. This subpart describes this idea in greater detail.
1. Rejecting the Intervention/Nonintervention Frame
The positive description of the state's role in the prevailing con-
ception of family autonomy-the depiction of autonomous families
free from all state intervention-is simply inaccurate. The state inter-
venes to varying degrees and in varying ways in the lives of all families
at all times. I use as a starting point the insight of Frances Olsen that
state intervention in the lives of families is an inevitable byproduct of
organized government, and that "nonintervention" is a myth.9 6
96 See Frances E. Olsen, The Myth of State Intervention in the Family, 18 U. Micu. J.L.
REFORM 835, 836 (1985). Professor Olsen has argued that the "private family," often
the basis for nonintervention, is a myth, or at least an "incoherent ideal." Id. at 835.
Thus the terms "intervention" and "nonintervention" are largely meaningless. Id.
Harkening back to the legal realists' deconstruction of a laissez-faire approach to gov-
ernment as a coherent legal frame, Olsen states that "[a]s long as a state exists and
enforces any laws at all, it makes political choices, The state cannot be neutral or
remain uninvolved, nor would anyone want the state to do so." Id. at 836; accord
GLENDON, supra note 72, at 307-08 ("[D]ebates framed in terms of choice between
intervention and nonintervention are as simplistic and unhelpful as those which try to
distinguish sharply between individual and societal interests. These false dichotomies
tend to obscure the facts that modern governments cannot avoid influencing families,
directly and indirectly, in countless ways and that individuals benefit, not only from
having 'rights,' but also from being surrounded by certain kinds of social arrange-
ments."); Rhode, supra note 76, at 1187 ("One of liberalism's most conspicuous inad-
equacies is its reliance on public/private distinctions, and its refusal to make gender
inequality in presumptively 'personal' spheres a central political issue.... The dichot-
omy of 'separate spheres' always has been illusory. The state determines what counts
as private and what forms of intimacy are entitled to public recognition. Policies gov-
erning tax, welfare, childcare, family, and workplace issues heavily influence personal
relationships."). Additionally, as feminist theorists have well-described, the state
determines both constitutive questions (which groupings of individuals will win the
moniker "family"), see Martha C. Nussbaum, The Future of Feminist Liberalism, in THE
SUBJECT OF CARE: FEMINIST PERSPECTIVES ON DEPENDENCY 186, 199 (Eva Feder Kittay &
Ellen K. Feder eds., 2002) ("The state constitutes the family structure through its laws,
defining which groups of people can count as families, defining the privileges and
rights of family members, defining what marriage and divorce are, what legitimacy
and parental responsibility are, and so forth. This difference makes a difference: The
state is present in the family from the start . . . ."), and normative questions of
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This myth is perpetuated by the "ideal of the private fam-
ily.",97
As Olsen elaborates, in the context of the family, opponents of
state intervention would still expect the state to reinforce parental
authority over children by, for example, returning runaway chil-
dren.98 Such opponents would equally expect the state to protect the
family from interference by third parties, such as a doctor who would
otherwise perform nonemergency surgery without parental approval,
or a neighbor who would take a child on vacation without parental
approval.99 Olsen sums up her perspective as follows:
[T] he problem with state officials taking children away from poor
parents is not really a problem of state "intervention," but a prob-
lem of the substance of that state behavior. What the state does is
sometimes so bad that people would rather it did nothing-which of
course is not possible. The effort to get the state to do nothing,
even if it were possible, misfocuses attention. It is misguided to
treat freedom as the polar opposite of state "intervention" or of gov-
ernment regulation. As Morris Cohen noted in another context,
real freedom depends upon opportunities supplied by institutions
that involve legal regulation. The attempt to criticize state "inter-
vention" instead of criticizing the particular policies pursued may
be especially limiting for poor people, who often have to rely on
various government programs and are thus less likely to benefit
from any political strategy based on the myth of nonintervention. 1 00
Following this line of reasoning, I question whether there is a
meaningful sphere of private (familial) decisionmaking that is sepa-
rate from, and unaffected by, decisions made by the state. If there is
such a sphere, then the concept of family autonomy has a role to play
in the debate over which decisions should be made by the state and
resource distribution (who will receive the state's largesse and with what strings
attached), see, e.g., Martha Minow, All In the Family & In All Families: Membership, Lov-
ing, and Owing, 95 W. VA. L. RPv. 275, 280 (1993) (arguing that it is not possible for
the state to be neutral about the definition of family because such definitions are
necessary for the distribution of legal rights and state largesse).
97 See Olsen, supra note 96, at 835.
98 See id. at 837.
99 Id. Although so-called "protective intervention" has been justified to protect
abused and neglected children or battered women (the idea being that the family
form has broken down, and thus state intervention is necessary to protect the vulnera-
ble), as Olsen argues, this is typically understood as the exception and noninterven-
tion as the norm. See id. at 841-42. As she contends, "focusing on 'nonintervention'
tends to mush and confuse the ethical and political choices we make. It directs our
attention to a false issue and obscures genuine issues of ethics and policy." See id. at
861.
100 Id. at 863.
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which decisions should be made by the family. But if 
there is not such
a sphere, then the concept of family autonomy 
is analytically bereft
with respect to this debate. One way to approach 
this question is to
try to identify a meaningful familial decision that 
does not turn, at
least in part, on a decision made by the state. I 
believe it cannot be
done.
The state influences the content of familial 
decisions in two
important ways. First, the state determines the 
contours of the world
in which a family lives and then permits parents 
to make decisions
within this geography. For example, the state has 
decided that all chil-
dren must be educated. A parent can decide where 
to send a child to
school, even choosing to educate her at home, 
but a parent cannot
decide to forego education altogether.
0 1 Even seemingly smaller
decisions made by the state-for example, whether 
to install sidewalks
in a new housing or commercial development-will, 
perhaps pro-
foundly, affect subsequent decisions made by a family. 
Of course sim-
ple decisions-whether to put a child's pants on 
before her shirt or
vice versa-are not affected by state decisions. 
But the state most cer-
tainly does determine whether a child wears 
clothes at all, and
whether those clothes are adequate and appropriate 
in light of, for
example, the weather.
Second, the state establishes a system authorizing 
parents to
make some decisions concerning children. Even 
those decisions that
we perceive to be made free of state control, such 
as a parent deciding
a course of medical treatment, are made within 
a decisional frame-
work determined by the state. Parents can 
make these decisions
because the state permits parents to 
make these decisions.'
02
Thus, the ideological construct of family 
autonomy is
overdeterminate, misstating the actual relationship 
between the state
and families. We believe family autonomy exists 
because, as I argue
shortly below, some state involvement is not perceived 
as such and,
therefore, we believe there is such a "thing" as 
autonomy from the
101 The decision in Yoder v. Wisconsin, 406 U.S. 205 
(1972), permitted an Amish
family to remove a child from school only after 
the age of fourteen. See id. at 234-36.
102 See Duncan Kennedy, The Stages of the Decline of the Public/Private 
Distinction, 130
U. PA. L. REV. 1349, 1351-52 (1982); Frances E. Olsen, 
The Family and the Market: A
Study of Ideology and Legal Reform, 96 HARV. L. REv. 1497, 1504-06 
(1983). For more
on the barren nature of the distinction between 
the state and family, see Jill Elaine
Hasday, Intimacy and Economic Exchange, 119 
HAV. L. REv. 491, 494-95 (2005). 1
acknowledge that there are numerous ways to describe 
state regulation of families and
that the baseline is contestable. For example, it 
could be argued that families used to
enjoy virtually all decisionmaking authority and that over time 
this authority has been
ceded to the state. Regardless of the origins 
of the current regulatory web surround-
ing families, it is clear that such a web exists.
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state. 10 3 In reality, families live and make decisions in the shadow of
the state all day long. To be sure, there is still value in parental deci-
sionmaking. 10 4 But family autonomy oversimplifies the complex rela-
tionship between families and the state. Once we acknowledge the
inevitable intertwining of families with the state, the central question
then becomes how and why the state should involve itself with families,
not whether it should do so.
2. An Alternative Frame: Mutual Dependency
All families need the state. Families who are economically stable
need the state in myriad ways. For example, such families benefit
from state rules governing marriage and divorce, inheritance rights,
and, perhaps most importantly, parental authority vis-A-vis third par-
ties. 0 5 Economically stable families also benefit from the continua-
tion of such supports as public education, the passage of protective
legislation such as the Family and Medical Leave Act, and the availabil-
ity of child care tax credits. Low-income families also need the state,
and some of their needs, such as for public education, overlap with
the needs of economically stable families. But many of their needs for
state support will differ, and may include such items as subsidized
housing and child care.
The narrative that some families operate without state support-
that they are independent-resonates because of the phenomenon of
background and foreground noise. Some types of state support are so
familiar, we take them for granted and they are not perceived as state
support, but rather simply the state of the world. This type of support
is background noise. Any change from this status quo, however, is
perceived and is suspect. It is foreground noise. The present level
and type of state support of families is not perceived because it has
been normalized. Thus, for example, public education is not per-
ceived as the massive state support program that it most surely is. But
a new form of state support-say, universal child care-changes the
status quo and thus is perceived as an aid to families.' 0 6
103 See infra text accompanying notes 105-06.
104 See infra Part 111.B.1 (describing the parent-child relationship as playing out
over time and involving the sharing of values).
105 1 recognize these benefits are not equally available to all economically stable
families, notably same-sex couples in the vast majority of states. Such families are at a
disadvantage because they do not enjoy the same protections as families with hetero-
sexual, married parents.
106 Other examples of omnipresent but largely unperceived state support include
the mortgage interest deduction and child care tax credit. According to a recent
report from the General Accounting Office, the federal interest mortgage deduction
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As families need the state, the state also needs families. The cur-
rent view of family autonomy as "freedom from" does not adequately
account for the state's interest in the well-being of children. This can
be formulated as an interest in ensuring a child develops into a citizen
capable of participating in a deliberative democracy, or, more basi-
cally, as an interest in the child growing up to be an adult who
requires minimal state spending. 10 7 For purposes of this Article, and
recognizing many possible criticisms of my term, I refer to this latter
type of adult as a "contributing member of society."
To elaborate on the state's two-fold interest: First, the state has an
interest in the existence of a citizenry capable of participating in a
deliberative democracy.1 0 8 Families play an important role in creating
such citizens (a "formative project," as Linda McClain terms it).109
equaled a $61.5 billion outlay equivalent in 2004, making it the second largest tax
preference outlay equivalent. See U.S. GOV'T ACCOUNTABIL1Y OFFICE, UNDERSTAND-
ING THE TAX REFORM DEBATE 12 (2005), available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/
d051009sp.pdf. Additionally, different kinds of support resonate in different ways.
For example, the child care tax credit is less controversial than state-sponsored child
care, in part because the former is viewed as state action that allows an individual to
retain more of what she "earned," rather than an affirmative transfer of resources
from the state to a family. It is important to acknowledge that either way the state is
subsidizing the family.
107 I recognize the bias in this formulation. State spending for low-income fami-
lies is pathologized, whereas other forms of state support, such as Medicare, are not.
108 See HANNAH ARENDT, THE HUMAN CONDITION 46 (1958); CAROLE PATEMAN, PAR-
TICIPATION AND DEMOCRATIC THEORY 103-11 (1970); Will Kymlicka & Wayne Norman,
Return of the Citizen: A Survey of Recent Work on Citizenship Theory, 104 ETHICS 352,
352-53 (1994); Goodwin Liu, Education, Equality, and National Citizenship, 116 YALE
LJ. 330, 344-48 (2006). The Supreme Court has recognized this interest. See Prince
v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 168 (1944) ("A democratic society rests, for its contin-
uance, upon the healthy, well-rounded growth of young people into full maturity as
citizens, with all that implies."). For a discussion of how our traditional governmental
structures may hinder participation, see Carrie Menkel-Meadow, The Lawyer's Role(s)
in Deliberative Democracy, 5 NEV. L.J. 347, 351-59 (2005).
109 Linda McClain has written about this extensively. See LINDA C. MCCLAIN, THE
PLACE OF FAMILIES 3, 17 (2006). Professor McClain describes the role of families "in
the project of forming persons into capable, responsible, self-governing citizens" and
argues that such "[a] formative project aims at fostering persons' capacities for demo-
cratic ... self-government .... " "Democratic self-government connotes what demo-
cratic theorists refer to as 'deliberative democracy' and implicates a person's capacity
to deliberate about his or her conception ofjustice .... " Id. Anne Dailey also makes
an interesting argument about the role families play in creating citizens capable of
participating in a deliberative democracy. See Anne Dailey, Developing Citizens, 91
IOWA L. REv. 431, 438-61 (2006). Professor Dailey argues that "acquir[ing] the inte-
grated cognitive and emotional capacities of mature reasoned thinking" is essential to
participation in a deliberative democracy. Id. at 433. She further contends that "the
integrated psychological capacities for personal self-reflection and emotional self-mas-
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But some families need social and economic supports to function bet-
ter and thus be able to undertake the formative project-ensuring
that as many individuals as possible are able to participate in the col-
lective enterprise we call a democratic society.""
Some scholars argue that the family is not the appropriate locus
for building the capacity of children. If families themselves are rife
with inequality, they are hardly the place to instill civic values and
notions ofjustice.I It has also been suggested that families exist for
other purposes and that they simply are not very good at this particu-
lar job, and instead such capacity-building should occur in the schools
and other public institutions. 1 2 I recognize these arguments, but I
tery," id. at 433, which curb the "regressive compulsions, urges, and desires that can
threaten to overwhelm mature ego functions," are learned through the relationship
between a very young child and her caregiver. Id. at 481. Left unchecked, these
.regressive impulses . . .threaten our democratic way of life from inside the body
politic" because they can lead to a "collective regression," which breaks down the
"normal processes of collective deliberation." Id. at 479, 481. Dailey cites several such
examples, such as the Japanese internment during World War II, which she contends
was a "massive failure[ in the reasoned judgment of legal decisionmakers and ordi-
nary citizens." Id. at 480.
110 This plays into a larger debate among political theorists about the role of state
support and participation in a democracy. On the one hand, it has been argued that
state support of those in need can be conceived of as a precondition to participation.
For example, T.H. Marshall argued that a welfare state is necessary to ensure all mem-
bers of society can participate fully because without economic security (social rights),
a person cannot exercise her civil and political rights. See Marshall, supra note 79, at
93; supra text accompanying notes 79-83 (defining and describing the relationship
between civil, political, and social rights). This is in contrast to the view that citizens
have a responsibility to be economically self-sufficient. This latter view can be summa-
rized as follows:
Whereas Marshall had argued that social rights enable the disadvantaged to
enter the mainstream of society and effectively exercise their civil and politi-
cal rights, the New Right argues that the welfare state has promoted passivity
among the poor, without actually improving their life chances, and created a
culture of dependency. Far from being the solution, the welfare state has
itself perpetuated the problem by reducing citizens to passive dependents
who are under bureaucratic tutelage.
Kymlicka & Norman, supra note 108, at 355-56. In this way, economic independence
is a precondition of full membership in society. See id. at 356. My vision of family
autonomy-engagement with the state, not freedom from it-is firmly on the side of
state support as a precondition of civic engagement.
111 See, e.g., Susan Moller Okin, Women, Equality & Citizenship, 99 QUEEN'S Q 56,
65 (1992) (arguing that children learn about male dominance over women in the
family setting).
112 See Kymlicka & Norman, supra note 108, at 364. Kymlicka and Norman argue
that families and other voluntary organizations cannot do all the work of preparing
citizens:
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believe families are still crucial players in the development of citizens.
In addition to a family's ability, in at least some instances, to teach
democratic values, families play an essential role in preparing a child
to engage in other settings. For example, even if schools are a better
locus for learning civic virtues, a child must arrive at school able to
learn such virtues. If the child's basic needs have not been met at
home, it will be harder to build her capacity when she is at school.113
Moreover, apart from the important goal of preparing future citi-
zens, the state also has an interest in families functioning well enough
that they produce contributing members of society. Again, families
play a key role here, given the overwhelming evidence that chronic
poverty poses serious risks to the emotional, cognitive, and physical
development of children, 1 4 regardless of whether the family is
involved in the child welfare system. If the state provided appropriate
social and economic supports, families likely would function better
and thus be able to do the important work of raising children who will
become contributing members of society.
Additionally, the state has an economic interest in providing this
kind of support. Although the message is so often lost in our short-
sighted political climate, preventive programs both work and are
cheaper than "back-end" programs like foster care and the criminal
While these associations may teach civic virtue, that is not their raison d'etre.
The reason why people join churches, families, or ethnic organizations is not
to learn civic virtue. It is, rather, to honor certain values and enjoy certain
human goods, and these motives may have little to do with the promotion of
citizenship.
Id.
113 See Dailey, supra note 109, at 458. Professor Dailey acknowledges the impor-
tant role of educational and civic institutions, but notes that "educational institutions
must build upon psychological structures and processes cultivated and established in
the very earliest years. Early family relationships play a foundational role in fostering
the emotional and cognitive mechanisms... upon which a liberal democratic educa-
tion can then build." Id.
114 See, e.g., ARLoC SHERMAN, POVERTY MATTERS 3-4 (1997) (describing risks associ-
ated with child poverty, such as the two times higher risk of being a dropout at ages
sixteen through twenty-four and the 3.4 times greater risk of being expelled from
school); J. Lawrence Aber et al., The Impact of Poverty on the Mental Health and Develop-
ment of Very Young Children, in HANDBOOK OF INFANT MENTAL HEALTH 113, 118-21
(Charles H. Zeanah,Jr. ed., 2d ed. 2000); GregJ. Duncan et al., Economic Deprivation
and Early Childhood Development, 65 CHILD DEV. 296, 311-15 (1994); Aletha C. Huston
et al., Children and Poverty: Issues in Contemporary Research, 65 CHID DEv. 275, 277-79
(1994); Vonnie C. McLoyd, Socioeconomic Disadvantage and Child Development, 53 AM.
PSYCHOLOGIST 185, 190-98 (1998). Of course there is some resilience on the part of
children. See, e.g., Huntington, supra note 11, at 683 n.227 (citing Emmy E. Werner,
Children of the Garden Island, Sci. Am., Apr. 1989, at 106).
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justice system. Examples abound, 15 and the adage of "pay now or 
pay
later" is a truism.116 Although some programs, such as universal, 
qual-
ity child care, would entail considerable up-front 
investment, these
investments do pay off over time.
1 7 And, importantly, some child
abuse and neglect prevention programs, such as the 
Nurse-Family
Partnership program described below, cost relatively 
little to imple-
ment and yet have striking results.'
18
115 See, e.g., STEVE Aos ET AL., WASH. STATE INST. 
FOR PUB. POLICY, BENEFITS AND
COSTS OF PREVENTION AND EARLY INTERVENTION 
PROGRAMS FOR YOUTH 6 tbl.1 (2004),
available at http://www.wsipp.wa.gov/rptfiles/04-07-3901 
.pdf (setting forth preventive
programs that save the state money, as well 
as those that do not); CHILDREN'S SENTI-
NEL NUTRITION ASSESSMENT PROGRAM, THE 
SAFETY NET IN Ac-TION 1, 3 (2004), available
at http://dcc2.bumc.bu.edu/csnappublic/CSNAP20
04.pdf (noting that "food insecu-
rity is associated with a greater likelihood of illnesses 
severe enough to warrant hospi-
talization for infants and toddlers," that infants 
and toddlers in food-insecure
households are thirty percent more likely to have 
a history of hospitalization, and that
one pediatric hospitalization costs an average of 
$11,300, whereas that same amount
would buy food stamps for a family for almost 
five years).
116 For example, children in foster care have 
particularly poor long-term out-
comes, whether from the initial abuse and neglect 
or the subsequent upheaval and
placement in foster care. See Huntington, supra 
note 11, at 661 n.1
2 3
. As Emily Buss
describes the trade-off between paying now or 
paying later:
[t]he entitlement to cash assistance and medical coverage; 
funding for pre-
ventive services including education and job training programs, 
family ther-
apy services, and drug treatment; and funding 
for child care are all
vulnerable to congressional reduction or elimination, 
in the name of shrink-
ing government and shifting responsibility for 
children to their parents.
Ironically, one of the predictable products of 
this "shrinkage" will be the
bloating of that very part of government that does 
so poorly at replacing the
care, love, and authority provided by parents. A 
true interest in helping par-
ents to do their job unencumbered by government intervention 
should
inspire support for precisely the kind of public assistance 
that allows as many
parents as possible to avoid the greatest conceivable 
intrusion on family
autonomy-the intrusion inevitably caused 
by the intervention of the child
welfare system.
Emily Buss, Parents' Rights and Parents Wronged, 
57 OHio ST. L.J. 431, 440 (1996). In
this way, the arguments for a capacity-building 
approach to child welfare differ from
those advanced by feminists for state support 
of care work. See, e.g., FINEMAN, supra
note 67, at 218-40 (advancing the argument for state 
support of care giving).
117 See, e.g., DANIELLE CHECCHI, THE ECONOMICS 
OF EDUCATION 163-203 (2006)
(documenting economic return on investments in 
education); Huntington, supra
note 70, at 136-39 (describing long-term return on investments 
in quality child care).
118 As I explore in greater detail below, see 
infra notes 142-50 and accompanying
text, that program costs approximately $8700 per family, seeJUDITH 
GLAZNER ET AL.,
EFFECT OF THE NURSE FAMILY PARTNERSHIP 
ON GOVERNMENT EXPENDITURES FOR 
VUL-
NERABLE FIRST-TIME MOTHERS AND THEIR 
CHILDREN IN ELMIRA, NEW YORK, MEMPHIS,
TENNESSEE, AND DENVER, COLORADO 16 tbl.5 
(2004), available at http://www.acf.hhs.
gov/programs/opre/welfareemploy/economic-analysis/reports/effect 
nursefam/
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Whether the state's interest is characterized as one of preparing
citizens or preventing future expenditures, or both, these interests are
not furthered by the prevailing conception of family autonomy. That
conception contributes to the state's failure to take affirmative respon-
sibility for the well-being of families.
The need of the state for families-indeed, the dependency of
the state on families-is mirrored by the need of families for state
support both in building the capacity of children and preparing them
to be contributing members of society. I understand this as the
mutual dependency of the state and families. A mutual dependency
frame acknowledges that all families need the state to some degree
and that the state has a keen self-interest in meeting those needs.
3. Taking Mutual Dependency Seriously
If mutual dependency of the state and families is both an apt
description of and prescription for the relationship between the state
and families, the challenge then is to determine how each institution
can best help the other. I propose a model of parent-state collabora-
tion that views the healthy functioning of parents as essential to pro-
viding services to children. This approach centers on mutual
dependency: The state has a strong interest in the well-being of chil-
dren, especially very young children, but the state largely cannot
reach these children without engaging parents. 119 Parents have a
effect.nursefam.pdf, and yet has a dramatic effect on rates of child abuse and neglect,
see David L. Olds, Prenatal and Infancy Home Visiting by Nurses: From Randomized Tials to
Community Replication, 3 PREVENTION SCi. 153, 161-62 (2002). Children in the pro-
gram have an eighty percent lower rate of child abuse and neglect as compared with
similarly situated children. See id.; see also Office of juvenile justice & Delinquency
Prevention, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Nurse-Family Partnership, http://www.dsgonline.
com/mpg2.5//TitleV MPGTable_lnd_Rec.asp?id=368 (last visited Feb. 23, 2007).
119 Let me be clear about the goal of the state's investments. I believe the state
should work toward equal opportunity, but not necessarily equal results, for families.
It is up to the parents to realize this opportunity. I should also add that state supports
should not focus solely on the parent-child relationship. Prevention and long-term
treatment should look at all the systems around a child. See Woodhouse, supra note
42, at 425-26; Woodhouse, supra note 94, at 85-86 ("An ecological theory, in contrast
to the child/parent/state triangle of constitutional theory . . . envisions children at
the center of concentric circles of human and natural systems. Rather than propos-
ing normative principles such as rights and duties, an ecological theory is descriptive
of the world as the child knows and experiences it."). Woodhouse terms this
approach "ecogenerism." Id. at 86. These systems range from those that directly
touch the child, such as the family (immediate and extended), neighborhood, school,
and peer group, to those systems that are not in direct contact with the child but
nonetheless influence the child, such as a parent's workplace. See Woodhouse, supra
note 42, at 425-26.
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strong interest in the well-being of their children, but they may not be
able to realize that interest without support from the state. To serve
these interests, the state should support families through general anti-
poverty measures as well as targeted prevention programs. Both are
essential to improve the well-being of children generally and prevent
child abuse and neglect specifically.
To elaborate, the state already, if inadequately, invests in older
children, largely through the public education system. But it is not
enough to invest in public institutions. If the goal is to protect the
well-being of children, the state needs to focus in particular on very
young children, especially in light of research establishing that the
time between birth and age three is a vitally important period of child
development. 1 2 0
To support very young children, the state could make some direct
investments in children, such as the provision of health care. But the
point that is so often missed is that the state must also invest in chil-
dren indirectly by attending to the needs of parents. Very young chil-
dren are predominantly with their families-not in schools or other
public institutions-during the key developmental phase. Therefore,
to protect these children, the state should support parents, enabling
them to care well for their children. I do not intend to explore here
the myriad ways the state can provide social and economic support to
parents, but rather to argue the necessity of its doing so.
120 See, e.g., CINDY OSER & JULIE COHEN, AMERICA'S BiA Es (2003). But see JANE
WALDFOGEL, WHAT CHILDREN NEED 18-20 (2006) (arguing that some of the age zero
to three debate has exaggerated the importance of the early years, which are not
"critical" in the sense that this is the only opportunity for child development, and that
both the early and later years are important to child development).
121 As I have said repeatedly in this Article, preventing child abuse and neglect will
entail a combination of general antipoverty programs as well as more targeted pro-
grams, such as the Nurse-Family Partnership. For two interesting proposals for how
the state could immediately begin supporting families, see ALsTrowr, supra note 70, at
75-85, 117-37 (proposing "caretaker resource accounts" and "life-planning insur-
ance"). One example of the kind of social support the state is beginning to offer
families are programs aimed at creating "healthy marriages." See Erik Eckholm, Pro-
gram Seeks to Fight Poverty by Building Family Ties, N.Y. TIMES, July 20, 2006, at A13
(describing $750 million earmarked in the federal welfare reauthorization bill for
"healthy marriage" and "responsible fatherhood" programs). These programs are
certainly subject to debate. Critics contend the promotion of marriage does little to
address the economic problems of poverty. See id. I agree that promoting marriage
(or, perhaps less controversially, promoting healthy relationships) will not alone ame-
liorate poverty, but I do believe that teaching relationship skills, particularly how to
manage conflict, is important for all couples. Indeed, "couples therapy" is widely
accepted practice among upper- and middle-class families, who are able to pay for
such support themselves. See id.
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Supporting very young children is simply widening our lens of
state responsibility. For example, public education can be seen as a
form of support that the state undertakes with the goal of creating
informed, capable citizens.1 22 Thus, the state assumes an enormous
responsibility for children beginning at age five. But there is no rea-
son why this responsibility should begin at that particular age. It
could be later; it could be far earlier. The point about foreground
and background noise is relevant again. Although it may seem politi-
cally impossible for the state to undertake the necessary investments
to support younger children, one reason for this is that these invest-
ments would be new and thus more perceptible. Because an invest-
ment in public education has become part of the fabric of society, it
has faded into background noise and thus is not perceived as the
capacity-building or protective investment that it is. In this way, advo-
cacy of universal, state-subsidized child care appears to be a call for a
new role for the state, but arguing in favor of publicly funded educa-
tion does not. There is not a meaningful difference between these
two types of investments, however, just a difference in familiarity and
thus perception. 123
122 See, e.g., Marshall, supra note 79, at 100 ("NWlhen the state guarantees that all
children shall be educated, it has the requirements and the nature of citizenship defi-
nitely in mind. It is trying to stimulate the growth of citizens in the making."); Liu,
supra note 108, at 335, 341-48 (arguing that the Citizenship Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment, coupled with Section 5, oblige Congress to ensure meaningful educa-
tional opportunity for all children as a way of securing the "full membership, effective
participation, and equal dignity of all citizens in the national community").
123 When deciding to make these investments, another issue to address will be
determining the scope of the investment. If providing economic and social supports
is a responsibility of the state, this raises the question of where the responsibility ends.
For example, when the state seeks to subsidize housing, will the provision of a
voucher sufficient for obtaining an apartment in a run-down neighborhood satisfy the
state's responsibility? Or must the state guarantee a decent apartment in a low-crime
neighborhood? A single-family home? See Mary Anne Case, How High the Apple Pie? A
Few Troubling Questions About VWere, Why, and How the Burden of Care for Children Should
Be Shifted, 76 CmI.-KENT L. REV. 1753 (2001). As Professor Case has argued, viewing
children as a public good raises questions such as the extent to which the state should
subsidize children-how much is enough?-and whether the state should subsidize
all children and all parents equally, see id. at 1771-73, knowing that some parents are
less well-equipped to parent and some children will not "produce positive external-
ites," id. at 1775. Professor Case advances these arguments in the context of the care
debate. In the child welfare context, some of her arguments are less relevant because
it is not simply a question of shifting economic burdens from those with children to
those without. In the child welfare system, the public is paying one way or the other
and the question is how to maximize public payments. I contend preventive measures
are a better use of tax dollars than back-end programs such as the maintenance of
half a million children a year in foster care. That said, it is still relevant to explore
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My argument for state support is based on both moral and 
practi-
cal grounds. A just state should ensure the well-being of children
because our most vulnerable citizens deserve the 
protection of the
state. But unlike those who would rescue children 
from their parents,
my argument is that the state can best protect children 
by supporting
the functioning of families. In addition to this moral 
obligation, the
state has a keen practical interest in a prevention-oriented 
approach
to child welfare because it will reduce harm to both 
parents and chil-
dren and serve the state's interest in the development 
of future citi-
zens and contributing members of society. By 
differentiating the
moral dimension of my argument from the practical 
achievement of
it, I am arguing that there is value in the state 
accepting the moral
imperative of this kind of orientation to child welfare. 
Indeed, even if
the state spent no additional monies on the child welfare 
system,
acknowledging the need for prevention and state 
support of families
would be a radical and beneficial change from the 
current approach
because it would acknowledge the role we all play 
in creating the cir-
cumstances that lead to child abuse 
and neglect. 124
such issues as the opportunity cost of directing 
limited funds to preventive programs.
Further, I do not make the claim that families are 
entitled to social and economic
supports that would enable the families to thrive. 
Rather, my baseline is that families
should receive the supports necessary to prevent or 
remedy, as much as possible, child
abuse and neglect. This level of support should help 
create the environment needed
for families to undertake the formative project or, at the very least, 
help prepare chil-
dren to be contributing members of society.
124 This acknowledgement would help us move 
away from the narrative of "bad"
parents. I refer here to the debate about whether 
parents who have abused or
neglected their children are undeserving. See, e.g., 
Symposium, The Rights of Parents
with Children in Foster Care: Removals Arising from Economic Hardship 
and the Predictive
Power of Race, 6 N.Y. Crrv L. REv. 61, 74 (2003) (statement of Martin 
Guggenheim) ("It
is the element of hatred that I wish to mention for 
a minute. There is a shocking
presumption generated by fear, by otherness, by a lot 
of things-that the parents of
children in foster care are bad for their children. 
They don't love them enough or
they don't have the ability C ] to raise them well. And I'm 
here to say that in my 30
years of work in this field, that is the most despicable 
slander of all,. and the most
difficult falsity to refute."); Catherine J. Ross, The Tyranny of Time: Vulnerable 
Children,
"Bad" Mothers, and Statutory Deadlines in Parental Termination 
Proceedings, 11 VA. J. Soc.
POL'Y & L. 176, 179 (2004) (noting that many parents are 
"victims in their own
right"). But see BARTHOLET, supra note 46, at 7 (decrying the "blood 
bias" in the cur-
rent child welfare system). I place myself firmly on the side of 
the debate that views
the majority of parents in the child welfare system as individuals 
who are well-inten-
tioned and trying their best, often under extremely 
difficult circumstances, to raise
their children well.
Some parents are wrongly treated by the child welfare 
system, and should not
have their children removed, see ROBERTS, supra note 
14, at 92-99 (describing evi-
dence of racial bias in child welfare, leading to the 
overremoval of African-American
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In sum, making state support the centerpiece of the child welfare
system will reduce poverty, lead to less child abuse and neglect, and
enable individuals to lead productive lives. Moreover, these preven-
tive measures would, in many cases, preclude the need for the radical
intervention that typifies the current system. To be sure, participation
in the preventive programs I envision would be voluntary. Thus, a
parent who refuses such support and then abuses or neglects her
child would still face involvement in the child welfare system. Further,
a parent who receives state support but abuses or neglects her child
also would face the system. In this way, the "stick" of the child welfare
system would remain despite the greater emphasis on prevention. But
a prevention-oriented approach to child welfare would at least intro-
duce a "carrot," a vast improvement over the current stick-only system.
B. Furthering Self-Determination
A conception of family autonomy built upon an understanding of
mutual dependency must address the trenchant concern that state
support of families is necessarily accompanied by state control of fami-
lies. Although engagement with the state likely will further family
integrity, by contrast, state support runs the risk of diminishing paren-
tal decisionmaking authority. The challenge is to provide support in a
way that fosters that authority. 12 5
1. Concerns About a Diversity of Decisionmaking
Before addressing how to protect parental decisionmaking, I
want to define broadly the nature of that decisionmaking authority.
children from their homes), while other parents have made poor decisions but, in
different circumstances, would have acted in a different manner. I therefore reject
the notion that parents who abuse or neglect their children should lose state defer-
ence to their decisions regarding the rearing of their children. I recognize that this is
the legal framework governing the child welfare system-parents who do not abuse
and neglect their children are viewed as good parents and thus deserving of state
deference. But parents with a poor "track record" lose their entitlement to this defer-
ence. My argument is that we should rethink this simple exchange. To be sure, some
children face tremendous risks in their own homes. I am not arguing that child abuse
or neglect is benign or that parents do not actually engage in such behavior. Rather,
my point is that with additional social and economic supports, many parents would be
able to meet the needs of their children because they would make different choices.
125 See Nedelsky, supra note 49, at 13 ("The characteristic problem of autonomy in
the modern state is not, as our tradition has taught us, to shield individuals from the
collective, to set up legal barriers around the individual which the state cannot cross,
but to ensure the autonomy of individuals when they are within the legitimate sphere
of collective power. The task is to render autonomy compatible with the interdepen-
dence which collective power (properly used) expresses.").
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This authority is traditionally understood as the right to make large,
discrete decisions, such as which religion, if any, the child should fol-
low, and which school the child should attend. The state cannot inter-
fere in a particular decision made at a particular time. But conceiving
of parental decisionmaking as a series of discrete events, occurring
intermittently, misstates the nature of raising children. Parental deci-
sionmaking that occurs over time is the essence of raising children.
Although there may be a few key decisions, child-rearing is much
more about the accumulation of small decisions. It is an ongoing
project.
If raising children is about a long-term social relationship, tradi-
tional notions of family autonomy misconceive the nature of the
autonomy needed. It is not only the freedom to make a particular
decision, but also the freedom to raise children consistent with a set of
values, which will be played out over time. Thus, autonomy takes on a
particular meaning in the context of families, and this meaning is
about the dynamic process of raising children, not protecting only an
isolated, static decision.
Returning to the challenge of accommodating state support and
parental decisionmaking authority, the state does have legitimate rea-
sons for conditioning the receipt of aid. For example, conditions
imposed by the state to ensure that public monies are used for their
intended purpose protect the state fisc and promote accountability to
the taxpayer.1 26 But there is a danger that the state will impose condi-
tions that go beyond these legitimate interests and instead seek to
usurp parental decisionmaking. 127 If the state offered universal
health care, it could be argued that parents would have an obligation
to use such medical care, even if doing so contravened their personal,
but not religiously based, views on appropriate medical care. For
example, a parent may believe in holistic medicine and therefore
choose an alternative-and for the sake of the hypothetical-ineffec-
tive treatment for a serious but not life-threatening childhood illness.
126 Acknowledging that there are legitimate state interests does, of course, beg the
question of how to define those interests. For example, some readers might argue
that the state has a legitimate interest in encouraging certain behavior and therefore
can and should impose behavior-modification conditions on the receipt of state sup-
port, even if those conditions infringe on parental decisionmaking authority. I
address this argument below. See infra notes 127-39 and accompanying text.
127 I recognize that in some instances government regulation can foster, not hin-
der, parental decisionmaking. For example, legal requirements that manufacturers
of certain electronic equipment install blocking devices enable a parent to exercise
greater control over the content that reaches her child. Although such examples
exist, my point is that regulation of low-income families is far more likely to diminish,
rather than augment, familial self-determination.
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Given the availability of medical care, the state could argue that the
parent neglected the child by not pursuing the course of treatment
approved by mainstream medicine and paid for by the state.
Although imposing conditions on families is, arguably, paternalis-
tic, in the current political climate such conditions are inevitable.
Therefore, the question is whether it is possible to mitigate the very
real concern that receiving state aid will be contingent on a parent
forfeiting her right to make decisions-large and small, today and
over time-for her child. Put more broadly, the challenge is how to
overcome the deeply entrenched history of exchanging self-determi-
nation for state support. From the perspective of the parent, the ques-
tion is what stands to be lost if the parent accepts state support to raise
a child. And from the perspective of the state, the question is what
types of conditions are necessary to protect the state's legitimate
interests.
Answering these questions is not easy and there is no silver bullet.
Rather, it is important to acknowledge these real and substantial con-
cerns and then to explore a few ways to mitigate the concerns. The
relationship between the state and families that I envision looks some-
thing like this: Families are provided the social and economic sup-
ports needed to prevent child abuse and neglect, which will be a
combination of general antipoverty policies and more targeted pro-
grams. At the same time, these supports are not overly conditioned
on the recipient engaging in any particular behavior, but rather on
the understanding that parents, even those who have abused or
neglected their children in the past, will generally make good deci-
sions for themselves and their children, and that parents are in the
best position to assess their family's needs. 128 I have several proposals
for how the state can provide support in a manner that does not com-
promise parental decisionmaking.
First, despite the normative control the state can exert when sup-
porting families, it is possible for the state to act in a manner that
enhances a family's self-determination. Indeed, this is what the state
128 It could be argued that "freedom from" includes the option for parents to
make bad decisions. Thus the question is whether social and economic supports are
truly facilitating familial self-determination, or whether there is necessarily a heavy
hand of incentives or requirements that accompany any kind of state support. Even
required education or drug treatment could be viewed as infringing on personal pre-
rogatives. In response to this anticipated argument, let me clarify that I am not pro-
posing complete state deference to parental decisionmaking. Rather, my argument is
that within the general constraints of what society has determined to constitute mini-
mally adequate parenting, the state should do more to help parents meet these stan-
dards, rather than simply penalizing parents after they fail to do so.
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does for economically stable families when it offers 
a child care tax
credit that enables a parent to select a child 
care provider of her
choice and receive a tax credit for payments made 
to that provider. 129
Thus, knowing it is possible to act in a manner that 
does not overly
condition aid, the state should consistently ask 
whether a proposed
condition on the receipt of aid furthers or hinders 
a family's self-
determination. If it hinders familial self-determination, 
it must then
be justified by a stronger countervailing state interest.
130
Of course these categories are not perspicuous. But 
one guiding
principle is to determine whether similar aid to 
economically stable
families is similarly conditioned. The child care credit 
is a good exam-
ple. The state does not require parents to use 
state-approved child
care as a condition of receiving the credit. Therefore, 
a child care
voucher that enables a low-income parent to obtain 
child care should
not be conditioned on this requirement either.
Further, we can distinguish between those decisions 
that the state
has expertise in making and those decisions 
that a parent has exper-
tise in making. There are some decisions that 
are better left to the
state, such as determining, based on extensive 
studies, which sub-
stance abuse treatment programs are effective 
and therefore should
be subsidized by the state.
1 3 1 By contrast, a family is far better able to
determine for itself what supports, 
if any, are needed.
132
129 See Child and Dependent Care Credit, 26 U.S.C. 
§ 21 (2000). A parent may
choose any provider, including an individual, 
the parent deems fit; the credit is not
limited to licensed child care providers. Id. § 21 (b) (2) (D). 
The ability to take a tax
deduction for dependents is an example of the 
state attaching even fewer strings. See
id. § 152.
130 An example of a state requirement that would 
override familial self-determina-
tion is childhood immunizations.
131 In making the distinction between decisions that 
should be made by the state
versus the family, I draw on the insights of Emily 
Buss. See Buss, supra note 56, at
29-35 (arguing that "relative competencies" should guide the 
allocation of develop-
mental control between parent and state, giving parents 
greater control over matters
with only private effects, and the state control over 
matters in which the state has a
direct stake, such as education, which affects an 
individual's ability to participate in
and contribute to "a healthy democracy and 
economy"). As Professor Buss noted
elsewhere, the state is not a good parent and 
would "do better to give parents the
means to be good parents themselves." Buss, 
supra note 116, at 440.
132 One process for families in the child welfare 
system that recognizes such exper-
tise is family group conferencing, which 
I have addressed in detail elsewhere. See
Huntington, supra note 11, at 672-87. Family 
group conferencing recognizes that
families have a considerable contribution to 
make in determining their own needs
and that the state benefits when it listens 
to families on this score. In family group
conferencing, the family itself determines 
what supports are needed-for example,
1527Y.. IN~ CHILD?41.1 WELFARE
NOTRE DAME LAW REVIEW
The state can also design programs in a manner that furthers
familial self-determination. Although vast cash transfers from the
state to the family for the family to use as it sees fit arguably would
maximize familial self-determination,' 3 such transfers are unlikely to
transpire. But the design of programs can recognize a family's exper-
tise in itself.134 In short, the actual interaction with the state makes a
difference.135 And if the state views familial self-determination as a
value the state has an interest in promoting, it will be more inclined to
do so. This self-determination is essential if families are to maintain
their distinctive role in our society as incubators for connectivity and
diverse values.' 3
6
Second, there are important lessons to be learned from the harm-
reduction model of social services. In that approach, the state
acknowledges that conditioning state support on certain behavior is
not always to the benefit of the recipient or the state. For example, in
the Housing First program, the state provides housing to the chroni-
child care, or transportation, or housing-and the state seeks to provide such
supports.
133 Cash transfers maximize decisionmaking in part because the effects of condi-
tions on benefits are not uniform. For example, if the state determined that a parent
could receive a child care credit only if the parent did not live with a same-sex part-
ner, this would not, in practical terms, affect the majority of recipients. In this way,
the burdens of conditions often are not evenly shared.
134 See supra note 132 (discussing family group conferencing).
135 See Nedelsky, supra note 49, at 14 ("The nature of people's interactions with
bureaucratic decision-making may be as important as the nature of legislative policy-
making in determining whether citizens are autonomous members of a democratic
society or dependent subjects of collective control." (footnote omitted)). Of course
state programs will entail some level of bureaucratization, which itself can be onerous.
But this is not my concern here. Instead, I am concerned about the types of condi-
tions that infringe on familial self-determination in a meaningful way, such as by per-
mitting the state to visit the home unannounced, or by penalizing a family by refusing
benefits for multiple children.
136 See Areen, supra note 93, at 893 ("The state's desire to maintain family auton-
omy is not only a matter of tradition, but also reflects a recognition of the family's
effectiveness as a social institution; no one has devised a better system for overseeing
the rearing of most children. Autonomous families not only provide the conditions
needed for the physical and emotional development of individual children, but also
make possible a religious and cultural diversity that might disappear if the state exten-
sively regulated or controlled child rearing."); cf Dailey, supra note 109, at 500-01
(articulating a principle for federal support of families which "assumes there is no
bright line between the private family and the State, and seeks instead to determine
the kinds of governmental action that usurp, rather than reinforce, the family's chil-
drearing role," and noting that where the line is drawn "turns in part on the distinc-
tion between inculcating particular moral values or life goals and securing conditions
that allow individuals eventually to choose those values and goals for themselves").
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cally homeless-individuals who are often struggling with multiple
problems, such as substance abuse and mental illness-without impos-
ing any conditions on the recipient. 137 This approach has been very
successful, leading to better outcomes for the recipient (long-term
housing, more stable mental health, and less substance abuse) and
much lower costs for the state. 3" Thus, purely as a policy matter, it is
important to ask whether conditions actually further the goals of the
program or whether, at least in some instances, conditioning support
is unnecessary or even detrimental to achieving the goals of the
program.
Third, a change in cultural attitudes towards low-income families
would go a long way toward overcoming the potential paternalism of
the state. The state trusts all families to raise children and make deci-
sions all day long. There is no reason why this trust should be dimin-
ished simply because the parent is using state money to effect her
decisions. Additionally, when the state (acting through social work-
ers) approaches families with the assumption that the families have
strengths and abilities, there is a greater chance for collaboration
between the state and families, and less need for the social workers to
make decisions for families. The success of this approach is evident in
the reforms to Alabama's child welfare system that I describe below. 3 9
Finally, equality among families should be a goal of state support.
When the state limits conditions on low-income families receiving aid,
it furthers that goal. The state also furthers this goal by providing aid
in the first place. The provision of state support would enable low-
income families to enjoy an equality of decisionmaking opportunity
because much decisionmaking requires access to resources. The abil-
ity to make health care decisions has little meaning if the child has no
health insurance and the parent no means to pay for the care.
137 See Nestor M. Davidson, "Housing First"for the Chronically Homeless: Challenges of
a New Service Model, 15 J. AFFORDABLE HOUSING 125, 125, 127-28 (2006); Sam
Tsemberis et al., Housing First, Consumer Choice, and Harm Reduction for Homeless Individ-
uaLs with a Dual Diagnosis, 94 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 651, 654-55 (2004). For a wonderful
anecdotal account of this program, see Malcolm Gladwell, Million-Dollar Murray, NEW
YORKER, Feb. 13-20, 2006, at 96.
138 See Davidson, supra note 137, at 127-28 (noting that such programs cost far
less than the "cycle of shelters, hospitals, mental hospitals, and incarceration" and
describing positive outcomes for clients in the areas of mental health and substance
abuse); see also Gladwell, supra note 137, at 96 (describing the one million dollars
spent by the state on services, such as emergency room visits, needed by one individ-
ual, as opposed to the typical $15,000 annual cost of permanent housing plus support-
ive services).
139 See infra text accompanying notes 161-68.
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2. Equality Among Families
Although I have focused throughout this Article on the needs 
of
low-income families, let me be clear that I am not proposing 
a two-
tiered family autonomy, one for economically stable 
families and one
for low-income families.1
4° Rather, my proposal is for one version of
family autonomy for all families. It may be true that economically sta-
ble families are better able to enjoy the "freedom from" vision of fam-
ily autonomy because their need for state support 
is not readily
apparent or pathologized and therefore is not conditioned 
on relin-
quishing familial self-determination. But my argument 
is not that
there should be a "freedom from" vision of family 
autonomy for such
families and an "engagement with" vision of family 
autonomy for low-
income families. Rather, my argument is that 
familial self-determina-
tion should be the goal of family autonomy, and 
to reach this goal we
need to establish two tenets in the relationship 
between families and
the state.
First, all families need state support. The particular 
forms of sup-
port will vary depending on a family's needs, 
but all families benefit
from and need such support, whether it comes from 
clear inheritance
rules or subsidized child care. Second, all families 
also need familial
140 A two-tiered version of family autonomy 
risks reinforcing the dual system of
family law that traditionally disadvantages, or at 
least sets apart, low-income families.
See, e.g., Marsha Garrison, Why Terminate Parental 
Rights?, 35 STAN. L. REv. 423, 433-34
(1983) (describing the distinction between private and public 
family law). Professor
Garrison notes that
public family law has seldom deferred to parental 
rights. The doctrine of
parental rights descends instead from common 
law inheritance and property
concepts which developed to resolve private 
disputes, and it has largely
remained so confined. Thus, as between a parent 
and another private indi-
vidual, courts have generally recognized superior 
parental rights to the cus-
tody and control of children, but under the family 
law of the poor, courts
have routinely ordered parents to cede custody to 
the state without any show-
ing of fault.
Id. (footnotes omitted); Hasday, Parenthood Divided, 
supra note 76, at 329-47
(describing the dual system of family law that emerged in 
the last quarter of the nine-
teenth century, which disadvantaged families that 
did not fit the dominant norm of a
male breadwinner able to support an entire family 
with his paycheck and further
arguing that for such families, state intervention 
was widely justified to protect chil-
dren from what was perceived as a harmful family 
situation); Jacobus tenBroek, Cali-
fornia's Dual System of Family Law: Its Origin, Development, and 
Present Status (pt. 1), 16
STAN. L. REv. 257, 262 (1964) (discussing distinction between 
"civil family law" and
the "family law of the poor," while noting that 
for poor families, the state readily
intervened between parent and child, while for 
other families, the state intervened
only in extreme circumstances, and then only 
when private parties initiated the
action).
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self-determination, which entails deference from the state regarding
parental decisionmaking. Currently, we do not explicitly condition
state support of economically stable families on those families forego-
ing a measure of familial self-determination. Therefore, we should
not do so for low-income families.
My proposal seeks to decouple state support from losses of self-
determination. There will be one set of rules for all families. All fami-
lies will receive state support as well as state deference to parental
decisionmaking (within the pre-set bounds that apply to all families;
no one is free to make decisions that result in child abuse or neglect).
C. Three Promising Examples
A reconceived family autonomy-one that continues to protect
family integrity and a diversity of parental decisionmaking but broad-
ens the vision of state responsibility for supporting families-is a novel
idea in child welfare. There are, however, examples of programs in
the field that make a step in the right direction, demonstrating how
familial self-determination and state support need not be zero sum.
This subpart describes three such programs. My intent in this subpart
is not to explore in detail the programs that embrace this approach,
nor to endorse any particular program, but rather to note that it is
possible to move toward a reconceived family autonomy.14
First, the Nurse-Family Partnership program has been very suc-
cessful in both preventing child abuse and neglect and serving the
needs of parents and children. In this program, a public health nurse
visits a low-income, first-time parent during pregnancy and the first
141 I also do not address potential criticisms of the three programs I describe,
including, for example, whether the success rates may, at least in part, be influenced
by selection bias. My intent is to begin a conversation about how we can better help
children by helping their families. Thus, for example, even if selection bias does
influence the success rates of these programs, such bias does not negate the help the
state has provided the families who participate on a voluntary basis. The point is that
the state can assist at least some families, and do so in a way that furthers familial self-
determination. Further, there are a number of implementation questions about the
exact nature and manner of the support the state would make available to families
under the "engagement with" model of family autonomy that I propose. As I have
said repeatedly in this Article, preventing child abuse and neglect will entail some
combination of general antipoverty and targeted prevention programs. The exact
combination of such programs is not the subject of this Article. Rather, my goal is to
propose a conception of autonomy that will lead to a new relationship between the
state and families. Once we have begun to think differently about how the state can
interact with families, I and others can continue the conversation and address these
interesting and important implementation issues.
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two years of a child's life.
142 The nurse works closely with the mother
on three main goals. First, the nurse helps improve 
prenatal health.
Second, the nurse aids the development and health 
of the child by
helping parents provide more competent care 
to the child. Third, the
nurse improves the family's economic stability 
by helping parents
develop and accomplish goals relating to staying 
in school and finding
work, as well as helping parents plan subsequent 
pregnancies. 143 The
program specifically addresses poverty-related 
problems, such as sub-
stance abuse.1
44
The results of the program are striking. Families 
receiving this
kind of support have an eighty percent lower 
incidence rate of child
abuse and neglect than similarly situated families.
145 The program
also produces numerous other benefits for parents, 
children, and the
state. 1 46 Moreover, it appears to be cost-effective.
14 7 The program
costs approximately $8700 per family,
148 as compared with the direct
142 See Office of Juvenile Justice & Delinquency 
Prevention, supra note 118, at 1.
143 See G.AZNER ET AL., supra note 118, at 1; see 
also Office of Juvenile Justice &
Delinquency Prevention, supra note 118, at 1 
("[Niurses work intensively with ...
mothers to improve maternal, prenatal, early 
childhood health, and well-being with
the expectation that this intervention will help 
achieve long-term improvements in
the lives of at-risk families.").
144 See Office of Juvenile Justice & Delinquency 
Prevention, supra note 118, at 1.
145 See Olds, supra note 118, at 161; see also 
id. at 161-63 (discussing this finding in
greater detail, and noting that evidence that 
reductions in child abuse and neglect
persisted over a fifteen-year period, despite an 
initial up-tick following the end of the
program, further finding that the participating 
families who did not experience lower
rates of child abuse or neglect were those 
that also involved domestic violence);
Office of Juvenile Justice & Delinquency Prevention, 
supra note 118, at 1 (noting the
many benefits from such partnerships).
146 Studies documenting the positive benefits 
of the program abound, but to give
just one example, children in the visited homes had lower rates 
of involvement in the
criminal justice system. See David Olds et al., Long-Term Effects 
of Nurse Home Visitation
on Children's Criminal and Antisocial Behavior: 15-Year 
Follow-up of a Randomized Controlled
Trial, 280 JAMA 1238, 1241 (1998).
147 1 am not arguing definitively that a preventive 
approach will save the state
money, although there are good reasons to think 
it will. See, e.g., GLAZNER ET AL.,
supra note 118, at 11-19 (documenting that during the 
fifteen-year period following
intervention, the average visited family used, 
in 2001 dollars, $56,600 less in govern-
ment services and paid $8300 more in taxes than a control 
group, resulting in a 393%
recovery over the fifteen-year period on the 
amount invested). My intention is to
point out the economic and noneconomic 
costs of the current system and suggest
that it may save money, and certainly would reduce 
human harm, to take a preventive
approach to child welfare.
148 See id. at 16.
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and indirect costs of the child welfare system
149 and the noneconomic
harms associated with child abuse 
and neglect. 50
Second, early childhood education programs are 
known for help-
ing children on a number of fronts, including cognitive 
and socio-
emotional development '
5 1 What is less known about these programs,
however, is that they also are associated with 
reduced rates of child
abuse and neglect, at least when the program involves 
the family and
offers services to the parents 
as well. 152
Thus, for example, the Chicago School District's 
Child-Parent
Center (CPC) provides early childhood education to children 
begin-
ning in preschool and either ending at kindergarten 
or continuing
until third grade -153 The program provides services 
to children,
including health screening and free meals, and 
to parents, including
home visits and referrals to social service agencies.
1 54 The program
also teaches parents in separate classrooms 
with different teachers.
155
A study of the program found that the rate of child 
abuse and neglect
among children in the preschool program was 
fifty-two percent lower
than the rate in the control group.
156 The results were even better for
those children who stayed in the program for at 
least four years. For
these children, the child abuse and neglect rate 
was forty-eight per-
cent lower than the rate for children in the program 
for one to four
years. 157
Like the Nurse-Family Partnership program, 
there is evidence
that the CPC is cost-effective. For a child enrolled 
in the program for
eighteen months, the program costs $6692, including all 
the services
to the family, and generates $47,759 in return to society 
by the time
149 See supra notes 1, 24-25 and accompanying 
text (describing twenty-two billion
dollars in direct costs and an estimated ninety-four 
billion dollars in indirect costs).
150 See supra note 26 (describing nonmonetary costs of 
the child welfare system).
151 See KAROLY ET AL., supra note 40, at xii-xvi.
152 See ArthurJ. Reynolds & Dylan L. Robertson, 
School-Based Early Intervention and
Later Child Maltreatment in the Chicago Longitudinal 
Study, 74 CHILD DEv. 3, 19-20
(2003).
153 See id. at 8.
154 See id.
155 See FIHT CreME: INVEST IN KIDS, supra note 
3, at 14 ("The parents have their
own teachers and classrooms. The program also 
conducts home visits and offers
many opportunities for parents to join in field trips or other activities 
with their chil-
dren. All of this is aimed at helping parents to learn 
and practice better child-raising
skills and to get them actively involved in their 
children's education."); Reynolds &
Robertson, supra note 152, at 8.
156 See A.J. Reynolds et al., School-Based Early 
Intervention and Child Well-Being in the
Chicago Longitudinal Study, 82 CHILD WELFARE 633, 643 
(2003); Reynolds & Robertson,
supra note 152, at 13-14.
157 See Reynolds & Robertson, supra note 152, 
at 14.
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the child is twenty-one. 158 The return includes savings from lower
rates of special education enrollment and fewer arrests, coupled with
higher taxes paid by the students when they graduate high school.159
The calculations do not account for any savings from reduced involve-
ment in the child welfare system and preventive health care, and thus
could be much higher.
Such prevention programs should be the cornerstone of the child
welfare system. The dominant conception of family autonomy does
not present a legal barrier to such programs, but the existence of the
hands-off culture created by the conception indicates that these pro-
grams are marginalized in the world of child welfare rather than
viewed as essential components. These types of preventive programs
can and should be the very first attempt the state makes to support
families.
Moreover, these prevention programs do not sacrifice familial
self-determination. The state support strengthens families, thus les-
sening the likelihood that the family will become involved in the child
welfare system and that the parents will lose custody of the child.
Additionally, this kind of program is far less intrusive than the kind of
state involvement that may lie down the road for such families if they
become involved in the child welfare system. In these two programs,
participation is voluntary and the state plays a facilitative role by help-
ing parents obtain what they want and need, not dictating certain
behavior or results. 160
A third promising example can be found in the reform of Ala-
bama's child welfare system. Although not a prevention program per
se, Alabama has embraced a new approach to child welfare that
embodies the elements of my proposed reconception of family auton-
omy. There, parents brought a class-action lawsuit challenging the
state's child welfare practices because the state did not do enough to
help families or protect children from abuse or neglect. The parties
agreed to a settlement in 1991 that required Alabama to completely
reform its child welfare system. 6 1 The consent decree obligated the
158 See Reynolds et al., supra note 156, at 645.
159 See id. at 644-45.
160 For a wonderful description of the experiences of a visiting nurse and the
effects on her clients, see Katherine Boo, Swamp Nurse, NEW YORKER, Feb. 6, 2006, at
54.
161 See BAZELON CTR. FOR MENrAL HEALTH LAW, MAKING CHILD WELFARE WoRK 5
(1998); PAMELA A. HOLCOMB ET AL., URBAN INST., RECENT CHANGES IN ALABAMA WEL-
FARE AND WoRK, CHILD CARE, AND CHILD WELFARE Svs-rEMs 13 (2001), available at
http://www.urban.org/uploadedPDF/310361-AL~update.pdf; Erik Eckhohm, Once
Woeful, Alabama Is Model in Child Welfare, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 20, 2005, at Al.
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state to provide services based on the strengths of children and par-
ents and to work to preserve families whenever possible.162
In reforming its system, Alabama has focused on two important
changes. It has more than doubled funding for services aimed to
keep families together. 6-3 The additional funds enable social workers
to provide individualized treatment plans and also offer previously
unavailable services.1 64 Further, Alabama has worked to change the
views of the social workers, who were used to perceiving deficits, not
strengths, in biological families.1 65 This shift in attitudes was aided by
a change of leadership. The Commissioner of the Department of
Human Resources at the time of the consent decree opposed the set-
tlement because she was concerned it would keep children in danger-
ous homes.' 66 By contrast, her successor embraced the goals of the
consent decree.' 67 The approach has been succeeding, with children
returned to biological parents and remaining safe in those homes' 68
Working more closely with families to promote family preserva-
tion and reunification embodies elements of a reconceived family
autonomy. It recognizes that both the state and families have impor-
tant but distinct roles to play in addressing the problems underlying
the abuse or neglect. The approach does not subscribe to the view
that parents must simply pull themselves up by their bootstraps and be
162 See lBAZELON CTR., supra, note 16l, at 51. New York City has made similar
changes, moving toward a model that recognizes the strengths of biological families
and working with families in an attempt to preserve them. This change is happening
on a policy level, reducing by half the number of children in foster care, and statistics
appear to support the conclusion that this shift has not compromised the safety of
those children not placed in foster care. See Leslie Kaufman, Debate Rekindled on Pres-
suring Families at Risk, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 4, 2006, at Al [hereinafter Kaufman, Debate];
Fernanda Santos, Placements in Foster Care Are at Lowest Since Mid-80's, N.Y. TIMES, Oct.
23, 2005, at A33. City officials attribute the reduction to a strong economy, a decline
in the use of crack cocaine, and an explicit policy adopted by the Administration for
Children's Services (ACS) that strives to keep children in their own families. See id.
The city offers substantial supports to parents, such as counseling, housing aid, and
substance abuse treatment. See id. This shift came under fire following a series of
high-profile fatalities among children known to the ACS. See Leslie Kaufman, Baby
Drowned as Mother Listened to CD's, Prosecutor Says, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 9, 2005, at BI; Kauf-
man, Debate, supra; Leslie Kaufman, Mother of Boy Who Died Was Trained, Agency Says,
N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 10, 2005, at 133; Leslie Kaufman & Jim Rutenberg, Agency Suspends
Supervisors After Girl's Death, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 19, 2006, at Al.
163 See HOLCOMB ET AL., supra note 161, at 14.
164 Id.
165 See BAZELON GTR., supra note 161, at 51.
166 See HOLCOMa ET AL., supra note 161, at 13.
167 See id.
168 See Eckholm, supra note 161.
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better parents. Rather, it acknowledges that there are serious
problems in the lives of many families and that these problems must
be addressed in order for children safely to remain with or return to
their biological families. Importantly, it recognizes that state assis-
tance in this effort is essential, but that social workers must work with
families and rely on their strengths to accomplish the stated goals.
All three programs demonstrate both that it is possible to help
children by supporting parents and that this does not inevitably erode
familial self-determination. It might be suggested that my proposal
will work only in countries with a tradition of strong social welfare
programs. My argument is not that we should radically change our
culture, but rather that we should make choices cognizant of their
repercussions. A post hoc child welfare system that does not serve the
interests of parents, children, or the state is inevitable if we continue
to take a hands-off approach to the support of families. Supporting
families need not contradict the American tradition of familial self-
determination-as demonstrated by the programs described above-
but the support itself is necessary if we want to reduce child abuse and
neglect, keep families together, and prepare the next generation of
citizens.
CONCLUSION
A prevention-oriented approach to child welfare consisting of
general antipoverty efforts and particularly emphasizing more
targeted prevention programs would be far more effective than the
current post hoc approach. But the dominant conception of family
autonomy-freedom from state control-poses a formidable concep-
tual barrier to the creation of a system that seeks principally to pre-
vent child abuse and neglect, rather than simply respond to crises. I
have proposed a reconception of family autonomy that would foster
an environment in which a prevention-oriented approach could take
root. This conception encourages engagement with the state, not sim-
ply freedom from it. It is rooted in the mutual dependency of the
state and families in building the capacity, or more basically, the com-
petency of the next generation. But state support should not, and
need not, come at the price of familial self-determination. The part-
nership I have proposed between families and the state holds tremen-
dous promise to address the serious failings of the current child
welfare system. It also holds the promise of greater equality among
families by acknowledging that all families need state support and all
families need self-determination.
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